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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT
COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11
DAVID A. HARRIS*
ABSTRACT

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, law enforcement agencies
have actively sought partnerships with Muslim communities in the United
States. Consistent with community-based policing, these partnerships are
designed to persuade members of these communities to share information
about possible extremist activity. These cooperative efforts have borne
fruit, resulting in important anti-terrorism prosecutions. But during the
past several years, law enforcement has begun to use another tactic
simultaneously: the FBI and some police departments have placed
informants in mosques and other religious institutions to gather
intelligence. The government justifies this tactic by asserting that it must
take a proactive stance in order to prevent attacks by terrorists from
outside the United States, and by so-called homegrown cells from within.
The problem is that, when the use of informants in a mosque becomes
known in a Muslim community, people within that community-the same
people that law enforcement has so assiduously courted as partners against
extremism-feel betrayed. This directly and deeply undermines efforts to
build partnerships, and the ability to gather intelligence that might flow
from those relationships is compromised or lost entirely.
As it stands, the law-whether in the form of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, defenses in substantive criminal law, or cases and statutes
supporting lawsuits against government surveillance -offers little help in
resolving this dilemma. Further, change in either statutes or Supreme
Court doctrine that might help address the problem seems vanishingly
unlikely.
Locally-negotiated agreements on the use of informants
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Author, GOOD COPS: THE
CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING (2005) and PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WIiy RACIAL
PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002). My thanks to my colleague Haider Ala Hamoudi for his
valuable comments on this article. I also thank the Fordham University School of Law
Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer's Work; the Muslim Bar Association of the City of
New York; the University of Pittsburgh School of Law Faculty Workshop; and the
University of Toledo Faculty Colloquium for the opportunity to present the ideas in this
article. Copyright @ 2009 by David A. Harris.
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represent the best alternative route toward both security against terrorists
and keeping Muslim communities inclined to assist in anti-terrorism
efforts. In these agreements, law enforcement might agree to limit some of
its considerable power to use informants in exchange for the continued
cooperation of the community. The article discusses how such agreements
might be reached, what they might strive to do substantively, and the
problems they might encounter.
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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, law
enforcement at all levels of government realized both the importance of
obtaining intelligence to prevent further attacks, and that the most

important source of such critical information was-and, in fact, could only
be-American Muslim communities' themselves. One can see an example
of this awakening in a 2006 speech by Robert Mueller, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).2 Mueller's address came just after
the arrest in Miami of seven men whom Mueller characterized,
collectively, as an example of domestic terrorism cells that pose a threat
potentially bigger than Al-Qaeda.' Mueller told his audience, many of

1. I use the phrases "Muslim community" and "Muslim communities" throughout this
article. It is important to note at the outset that this should not lead readers into thinking
that Muslims in the United States constitute a monolithic group. This is not the case;
Muslims in the United States come from a wide variety of nations and ethnic backgrounds,
and often do not act or speak as a single bloc. See infra notes 268-70 and accompanying
text.
2. Robert S. Mueller, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the City Club of
Cleveland (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrellspeeches/mueller
062306.htm.
3. See id. ("These homegrown terrorists may prove to be as dangerous as groups like
al Qaeda, if not more so.").
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whom were Muslim, that the deadliest terrorist attacks after
September 11, 2001, both carried out and thwarted, were planned by
people raised in the countries they attacked or targeted.s If the United
States wished to prevent attacks, Mueller said, close cooperation between
law enforcement and Muslim communities in the United States would
become absolutely vital.6 Mueller appealed directly to American Muslims
for assistance:
There are those [within American Muslim communities] who view
the FBI with suspicion, and we must bridge that gap.... We need
to reach the point where you are willing to come forward [to law
enforcement] and say, "I have seen or heard something that you
need to know.". .. The radicalization cycle can only be broken if
we stand together against terrorism.'
Mueller's comments in 2006 remain accurate today. He saw the
situation properly when he said that law enforcement cannot ignore even a
remote possibility of homegrown terrorist cells in the United States.' This
4. See Mike Tobin, FBI Chief Warns of Domestic Terroristsin City Club Speech,
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 24, 2006, at A4 (noting that "local Muslims made up a sizable
contingent of the 250 people at the sold-out speech").
5. Mueller, supra note 2. The seven individuals arrested in Miami had all the
characteristics, Mueller said, of a "homegrown terrorist cell." Id. As examples of
"homegrown" cells overseas, Mueller cited terrorist attacks launched (or aborted by police)
in Madrid, London, and Toronto. Id. In the United States, he cited the 2006 arrest of three
men in Toledo, Ohio, on charges of plotting to smuggle weapons into Iraq. Id. It is worth
noting that, by the summer of 2007, the government seemed less concerned with
homegrown cells and more concerned with Al-Qaeda, because the organization had
managed to reconstitute and strengthen itself in ungovernable border areas of Pakistan.
See NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST
THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND (2007) ("Al-Qa'ida is and will remain the most serious
terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact

plots .... We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland
attack capability .... [W]e judge that al-Qa'ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives
See also
here."), available at http://www.dni.gov/press-releases/20070717_release.pdf.
Karen DeYoung & Walter Pincus, Al-Qaeda 's Gains Keep U.S. atRisk, Report Says; Safe
Haven in Pakistan Is Seen as Challenging CounterterrorismEfforts, WASH. POST, July 18,
2007, at Al (reporting that a new national intelligence estimate concluded that the United
States would face a "persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years" and
that Al-Qaeda would remain "the most serious element of that threat"); Scott Shane, Same
People, Same Threat, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at Al (stating that the "major threat" to
the United States is Al-Qaeda, as was true in 2001).
6. See Mueller, supra note 2 ("We must also build relationships within the Muslim
community to counter the spread of extremist ideology."). This assessment-that
enforcement can only defend the country against such attacks with the assistance of
Muslims-is one with which law enforcement, intelligence, and anti-terrorism officials the
world over agree. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
7. Mueller, supra note 2.
8. See id. ("We need to know the risk factors and the potential targets for criminal and
terrorist activity. With this information, we can find and stop homegrown terrorists before
they strike.").

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

2010] LA WENFORCEMENTAND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 127

remains true even though experts believe that the possibility of such
homegrown terrorism in the United States does not approach the risk
faced by our allies in Europe.' Furthermore, Mueller correctly stated that
success in heading off terrorism in America largely depends upon
cooperative relationships between Muslim communities and law
enforcement. These partnerships have extraordinary importance because
they form information pipelines-conduits through which our law
enforcement agencies can learn about real, concrete terrorist plots.
Looking at the cases the government has brought against terrorist
suspects since September of 2001, one cannot help but notice that Muslim
communities have done exactly what Mueller wants: they have actively
brought the FBIand otherpolice agencies crucialinformation in terrorism
cases. For example, the FBI's six cases in Lackawanna, New York, still
stand as some of its greatest anti-terrorism victories. These cases involved
a group of six young men of Yemeni descent accused of engaging in
terrorist activity by, among other things, attending terrorist training
camps."o The cases, announced with great fanfare by the FBI and the
office of then-Attorney General John Ashcroft," resulted in guilty pleas
from, and sentences of up to ten years in prison for, all of the accused.12
Few people seem to remember that the arrests occurred only because
Lackawanna's Yemeni community itself brought the men to the FBI's

9. See, e.g., EBEN KAPLAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMERICAN MUSLIMS
AND THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN TERRORISM (2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/
11509/Americanmuslimsandthethreat_of-homegrownterrorism.html?breadcrumb=%
2Fissue%2F24%2Fdefensehomelandsecurity#2
(declaring that, generally speaking,
Muslims integrate into American society more thoroughly than their counterparts in
Europe). See alsoSpencer Ackerman, Religious Protection,NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 2005,
at 18, 20 (partially attributing lower rates of homegrown Islamic extremism in the United
States as compared Europe to the fact that the United States "offers better social and
economic opportunities to its Muslim citizens," but mostly to "America's ability to
accommodate Islam itself'). While polling data suggests that younger American Muslims
are, perhaps surprisingly, accepting of suicide terrorism in defense of Islam, those holding
these views still constitute a smaller percentage of the American Arab and Muslim
communities than is true in Europe. PEW RESEARCH CrR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE
CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 53-54 (2007) (polling data reveal that while younger
U.S. Muslims are more likely than older Muslim Americans to support suicide bombing in
the defense of Islam, absolute levels of support for such extremism among Muslim
Americans remains low, especially as compared to Muslims around the world), available at
http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf.
10. Philip Shenon, U.S. Says Suspects A waitedan Orderfor TerrorStrike, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2002, at Al.
11. See generallyid. (reporting on the announcement of the arrests of the Lackawanna
Six).
12. Lowell Bergman, Qaeda Trainee Is Reported Seized in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2004, at A23. For an in-depth look at the Lackawanna case, see DINA TEMPLERASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND ROUGH JUSTICE IN AN AGE
OF TERROR (2007).
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attention. 13 Without that information, the Lackawanna cell might have
remained undiscovered, perhaps with disastrous results. The success of the
Lackawanna case (and others like it) explains the strong consensus among
law enforcement and security experts, both nationally and internationally,
that cooperation and partnership between law enforcement and Muslim
communities represent the key to success against terrorists. 14
But the creation and cultivation of partnerships between law
enforcement and Muslim communities does not represent the only effort
by the FBI and local police to gather intelligence to prevent terrorism.
Over the past several years, the FBI and the New York Police Department
have made increasing use of informants-untrained civilians often in legal
jeopardy themselves, who receive money or other significant benefits"placing them as spies in Muslim religious and cultural institutions." In at
least some cases-for example, in New York City" and in Lodi,
California"-investigations based on the use of informants have resulted
in convictions, though some doubt remains about the scope of these
victories and the need for these kinds of efforts inside the United States19
13. See Shenon, supra note 10 ("Officials said it was information from inside [the
Yemeni community in which the suspects lived] that led them to conduct an inquiry
there."); Frontline: Chasing the Sleeper Cell (PBS television broadcast Oct. 16, 2003)

(featuring an interview with the agent in charge of investigation in Lackawanna, who
explained that the investigation began after Lackawanna's Yemeni community sent a letter
to the FBI's Buffalo office), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
sleeper/etc/script.html.
14. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
15. I define informants in this way to distinguish them from both trained police officers
working undercover and, more importantly for purposes of this article, people who might
come forward from inside these communities to pass information on to law enforcement.
The latter type of individual might also be called an informant, but her actions present
entirely different questions than those discussed here. When law enforcement places its
informants into situations or institutions, it deliberately targets these institutions and the
individuals within them for investigation. In doing so, law enforcement raises issues
regarding the use of power and discretion, the judicial branch's supervision of these efforts,
the compliance with rules for the use of this discretion, and, especially, whether the facts
should meet some threshold test before police exercise this discretion. When individuals
come forward from within these institutions to inform law enforcement, they act not as law
enforcement's agents, but rather as concerned citizens who wish, in good faith, to report
something suspicious.
16. See, e.g., Andrea Elliott, As Police Watch for Terrorists, Brooklyn Muslims Feel

the Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at B4 ("It is no secret to the Muslim immigrants of Bay
Ridge, Brooklyn, that spies live among them.... It is another thing for them to be officially
revealed. Over the last several weeks . .. Muslims in Bay Ridge learned that two agents of
the police had been planted in the neighborhood and were instrumental to the [prosecution
of a fellow Muslim].").
17. See infra notes 68-72, 94-103 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 73-75 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, US. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on
Terrorism Charges,WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at Al (reporting that an analysis of the

Justice Department's list of terrorism prosecutions indicated that "the government's effort
to identify terrorists in the United States has been less successful than authorities have
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Despite these doubts, in the last months of the Bush Administration
Attorney General Michael Mukasey announced significant changes in FBI
rules that would allow for greater use of informants in Muslim cultural and
religious institutions. 20 The Attorney General went ahead with these
actions despite objections that this would lead to racial profiling in
terrorism investigations 21 and would pose a threat to the civil liberties of

often suggested" and that, in the end, "most cases on the Justice Department list [of
terrorism prosecutions] turned out to have no connection to terrorism at all"); John
Mueller, Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the OmnipresentEnemy, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 2 (asserting that the reason for the lack of any attacks in the
United States since September of 2001 is that there are no terrorists in the United States
and that those outside the United States do not have the means or the desire to strike from
abroad); Scott Shane & Lowell Bergman, Adding Up the Ounces of Prevention, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 4, at 1 (quoting a former Central Intelligence Agency officer as
stating that "[t]he Miami case is nonsense . .. [t]hose are absolute jokers," and explaining
that analysis of the evidence indicates that threat of terrorism inside the United States has
been greatly exaggerated by the government).
20. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Joint Statement of Attorney General Michael
B. Mukasey and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller on the Issuance of the Attorney General
Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Oct. 3, 2008), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/
See also Memorandum from the Office of the
opa/pr/2008/October/08-opa-890.html.
Attorney Gen. to the Heads of Dep't Components 2-3 (Sept. 29, 2008) (explaining that the
new guidelines enable the FBI to task "human sources," otherwise known as "informants"
or "assets," to seek information about threats to national security in addition to their
function under the old guidelines, which was limited to checking leads in ordinary criminal
investigations), availableat http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ guidelines-memo.pdf.
21. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union expressed "deep concern"
because the FBI would now have the power to begin investigations based on the race or
ethnicity of suspects. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, New F.B.I. Guidelines
Open Door to Further Abuse (Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefreel
general/36732prs20080912.htmi. The ACLU's executive director accused the Attorney
General of "[i]ssuing guidelines that permit racial profiling"; he also complained that "[t]he
new guidelines offer no specifics on how the FBI will ensure that race and religion are not
used improperly as proxies for suspicion." Id. Muslim and Arab communities in the
United States also expressed fear of racial and religious profiling. See, e.g., Niraj Warikoo,
FBI Power in TerrorCases Grows, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 30, 2008, at 1 (quoting an
attorney in Dearborn, Michigan, who has frequently defended Arab Americans in national
security cases, as saying, "There is anxiety the Middle Eastern community will be targeted. .
. . There is always a danger in the implementation when you give such discretion in the
hands of agents."). The Department of Justice attempted to reassure opponents, explaining
that the new Guidelines would "work in tandem with the Attorney General's Guidance
Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies," which, according to
the Department, "prohibit[s] opening an investigation based solely on an individual's race,
ethnicity, or religion." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Attorney General
Consolidated Guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations (Oct. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2008/October/08-ag-889.html. While this statement is literally
true, it omits enough to be deceptive. It fails to mention that the Guidance Regarding the
Use of Race contains an exception for any investigation involving national security or
immigration matters-precisely the subjects for which the government has used profiling to
investigate Muslims and Arab Americans. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING
THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAw ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance-on-race.pdf.
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Muslims and Arab Americans.22
Using informants in Muslim religious and cultural contexts too
frequently and casually damages the FBI's critical and generally successful
efforts to build partnerships with Muslim and Arab American
communities. It will cause lasting damage to efforts to bring Muslim
communities and law enforcement together to build a common cause
against extremism, and it will harm efforts to obtain intelligence from
these communities through carefully-built cooperative relationships
established in the last five years. The reaction of Muslim communities to
news of the involvement of informants in terrorism cases has, in fact,
seemed especially sharp precisely because it comes against a background
of police and community efforts to engage in purposeful cooperation.
When Muslims learn that the government has used informants, members
of these communities feel used and betrayed-not partners of law
enforcement, but suspects, each and every one.23 We can ill afford to
damage the possibility that these partnerships can serve as sources of
information; they remain our best-perhaps our only-hope for obtaining
the intelligence we need to head off the damage of actual terrorist attacks
Constructing these law enforcement/community
in the future.
22. Little current commentary has addressed the issue of the contemporary use of
informants in religious institutions, particularly mosques. The only up-to-date examination
of this problem is Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies and Videotape: The Surveillance and
Infiltration of Relgious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (2004), which I address directly in
Section III, infra. Other related writings have generally concerned themselves with the
Attorney General's guidelines for surveillance. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, The First
Amendment and the War Against Terrorism, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 6 n.13 (contrasting
then-current Attorney General guidelines with predecessors); William C. Banks & M.E.
Bowman, Executive Authority for National SecuritySurveillance,50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2635, 68-76 (2000) (examining surveillance from the Hoover era through the present,
especially Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act surveillance); David Berry, The First
Amendment and Law Enforcement Infiltration of Political Groups, 56 S. CAL. REV. 207,
233-36 (1982) (advocating that Congress enact a bill to protect First Amendment rights that
current police and FBI practices are compromising); Don Edwards, Reordering the
Prioritiesof the FRB.I in Light of the End of the Cold War, 65 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 59, 79-84
(1991) (advocating an increased congressional role in regulating the FBI, since FBI selfgovernance on these matters has not proven effective); Jon T. Elliff, The Attorney
General's Guidelines for FB.L Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 785 (1985)
(comparing Smith and Levi Guidelines); Eric Lardiere, The Justiciability and
Constitutionalityof PoliticalInteligence Gathering,30 UCLA L. REV. 976, 1007-34 (1983)
(proposing new standards of justiciability for lawsuits challenging the FBI's surveillance
practices); David M. Park, Re-examining the Attorney General's Guidelines for FB.L
InvestigationsofDomestic Groups,39 ARIz. L. REV. 769, 772-75 (1997) (examining history
of Attorney General guidelines from Levi to Reno); Mitchell S. Rubin, The FB.I and
Dissidents: A First Amendment Analysis of Attorney General Smith's 1983 FB.I
Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 454-55 (1985)
(comparing Smith and Levi guidelines); Athan G. Theoharis, FB.L Surveillance: Past and
Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 893-94 (1984) (arguing for a "tightly worded" FBI
legislative charter).
23. See infra Section I.B.
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partnerships requires great efforts to build trust;24 as a result, when the use
of informants has come to light, the community perceives this as a betrayal
of that trust.
As it now stands, the law provides virtually no legal protection against
use
of government informants. The Fourth Amendment imposes no
the
standards for, and does not require any judicial oversight of, police use of
informants.' Neither substantive criminal law defenses2 nor civil actions27
hold any promise of restraining this type of government activity.
Therefore, we find ourselves at a sensitive crossroads. On the one hand,
we cannot wholly discount the possibility that very small groups of
terrorists in our country may attempt to do catastrophic damage. And it
remains at least possible that infiltration of these groups by informants
could prevent a disaster. On the other hand, the unregulated use of
informants in mosques and other religious and cultural settings can also do
great damage because it poses the risk of cutting off our best possible
source of intelligence: the voluntary, cooperative relationships that have
developed between law enforcement and Muslim communities.
Both the courts and legislative bodies seem extremely unlikely to
move toward greater regulation of police use of informants in this setting,28
so any initiative must come from somewhere else. Fortunately, the
unusual circumstances of the situation may provide an answer. While the
idea may seem counterintuitive at first, close study reveals that the
interested parties-law enforcement on the one hand and Muslim
communities on the other-stand in a unique relationship of reinforcing
mutual need. This situation thus presents an exceptional opportunity for
the negotiation of cooperative agreements in which both sides might gain.
Law enforcement might agree to (at least mildly) restrict its own ability to
use informants in the most sensitive situations; in turn, the Muslim
community would pledge to continue and, when possible, to increase its
voluntary cooperation. All of this could be accomplished through local
agreements governing the use of informants that both police and the
community could accept. While negotiated limits on law enforcement
power represent a novel approach to police regulation, few other
possibilities for change seem promising. Even though parties traveling this
path would surely encounter formidable obstacles, the status quo offers
little hope of averting harm to the different but overlapping goals that law
enforcement and Muslim communities have. To state the matter simply, a
See infra note 37.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Sections II.B.1-2.
See infra Section II.B.3.
28. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror,111
24.
25.
26.
27.

YALE

L.J. 2137,

2158-59 (arguing that the shadow of 9/11 and the "specter" of suicide terrorist attacks hang
over any decision involving law enforcement power).
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negotiated set of limitations on the use of informants represents the last
best chance to salvage the relationships that law enforcement and Muslim
communities must have in order to fight terrorism, as well as to use
informants judiciously and carefully to infiltrate possible terrorist cells
when real danger exists.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I discusses recent efforts to
build bridges between law enforcement and American Muslim
communities and recounts the counter-productive effect the use of
informants in these communities has had. Section II examines what the
law allows law enforcement to do with informants. Section III explains
why we should expect the use of police informants in Muslim communities
to persist or even grow; explores the costs of the use of informants to both
the community and to security efforts; and concludes that, in light of these
factors, some regulation of information practice seems desirable. Finally,
Section IV proposes locally-created, informal agreements on accepted
practices for the use of informants.
I.
BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE, AND THE USE OF
INFORMANTS IN THOSE COMMUNITIES

The first priority in our struggle against terrorism remains the
gathering of intelligence. The reason for this is simple but profoundly
important. Only through the constant collection and careful analysis of
pertinent information can our public safety and security services not just
respond to terrorist activity after the fact but stop it before it happens. As
with other aspects of anti-terrorism work, different strategies and tactics
exist for gathering intelligence, and law enforcement and security officials
can choose among the best approaches. It is important, therefore, to take
note of the wide agreement among officials about the effectiveness,
importance, and centrality of one particular method of intelligence
gathering: the creation and cultivation of strong relationships and
partnerships between law enforcement and Muslim communities, in order
that intelligence flows from these communities to law enforcement as
easily as possible.29 Without these bridges, we lack the necessary
connections to receive intelligence from those inclined to give it.
Moreover, we find the connections that we do have undermined, or
perhaps destroyed, by the perception of betrayal.

29. See infra note 35.
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A. Bridge BuildingBetween Law Enforcement andMuslim Communities

For at least one reason, the consensus on the importance of building
trust-based relationships as a way to fight terror cannot surprise anyone in
law enforcement: we know this method works. In fact, building good
relations with Muslim communities has paid off against terrorists in the
most direct way possible. The Lackawanna case3 o remains a showcase
example. The men apprehended in that case, who were characterized by
the U.S. Department of Justice as a sleeper cell waiting for the word to put
their deadly agenda into action, might have attacked except for the fact
that the local Muslim community passed crucial information to the FBI
that prompted their investigation. And the Lackawanna case does not
stand alone. For example, in the Toledo terrorism case mentioned by FBI
Director Robert Mueller in his 2006 speech in Cleveland," the Muslim
community played the same kind of critical role. When the FBI
announced the indictments of the three individuals in Toledo, Ted Wasky,
the FBI's Special Agent in Charge of the Cleveland field office, explicitly
acknowledged the help of Toledo's Muslims.3 2 Wasky praised the
extensive and essential cooperation of members of the local Muslim
community in the case, and said that this cooperation resulted in important
information flowing to law enforcement.33 "[The members of the Toledo
Muslim community] are the ones who deserve the most credit," Wasky
said. "The ability to prevent another terrorist attack cannot be won
without the support that the community gave."34
The widespread agreement in law enforcement that the cooperation of
Muslim communities remains vital to the success of anti-terrorism efforts
owes much to the strong consensus in law enforcement, building for at
least twenty years, on the basic principles, goals, and benefits of
community policing." Law enforcement almost everywhere acknowledges
30. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
31. See Mueller, supra note 2.
32. Toledo's Arab Community Called "Crucial" to Terrorism Investigation,
WTOL.CoM, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.wtol.com/Global/story.asp?S=4533250.
33. See id. (quoting Wasky as saying that the local Arab community was "crucial" to
the investigation).
34. Id. See also Richard B. Schmitt, Cloud of Suspicion Hangs over Toledo, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at All ("Toledo's Muslim community has a history of cooperating
with law enforcement, which may have been the suspects' undoing. An FBI official
credited local Muslim groups Tuesday with providing crucial information that led to the
arrests.").
35. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 2 (quoting a fellow for counterterrorism at the
Manhattan Institute as saying that "[glood community policing-establishing relationships
and keeping abreast of trends in a neighborhood 'based on common interests other than
terrorism'-underpins any effort to detect a homegrown plot"). To be sure, there are
critics of the community policing model who find it wanting in significant ways. See, e.g.,
Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing,90 CAL. L. REV.
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that police efforts alone cannot make cities and towns safe from crime and
criminals; rather, public safety requires a partnership between police and
the community that encourages communication about people and events
on the ground.36 Community policing means far more than community
relations or shallow, one-off efforts by police agencies to exhibit sensitivity
or hear the concerns of the communities they serve. Rather, it requires a
deep commitment to the idea that success in public safety efforts of any
kind can only occur when strong, positive connections exist between police
and those whom they serve-that is, through partnerships based on trust.37
That type of partnership requires sustained effort by both the police and
communities to build trust through establishing relationships and networks
with each other, to develop a track record of joint efforts toward common
goals, and to respect each other as real partners.38 The lessons for our antiterrorism efforts seem clear: if we believe that potential terrorists lurk in
our Muslim communities, we must have good communications with them.
This requires relationships built on trust-just like everything else in
community policing.
If building these relationships between law enforcement and
communities usually takes considerable effort, it has been even more
difficult to build them between law enforcement and Muslim communities.
First, in many jurisdictions prior to September 11, 2001, no relationships
existed at all between Muslim communities and the FBI and police
departments. According to Michael Rolince, a thirty-one-year veteran of
the FBI who now works as a counterterrorism consultant in the private
sector: "After 9/11, I was of the opinion that we didn't have the kind of
inroads [into the Muslim community] that we needed to have." Rolince
states that he and his colleagues "didn't know what was in our own
backyard" as far as the Muslim population, so they had to begin their
efforts from scratch.39
As if starting from the very beginning would not be hard enough, any
1513, 1513-15 (2002) ("[Proponents of community policing] have so far failed to identify a
single theory of crime control that is comparable in parsimony and prescriptive richness to
the rational-actor model that animates traditional policing strategies. . . . [M]ost of the
[community policing] strategies also have at least the potential to disrupt reciprocal
cooperation. . . .").
36. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 13 (1994)
("Community policing consists of two complementary core components, community
partnershicand problem solving."), availableat http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf.
38. For a broader view of the history and future of community policing efforts in the
United States, as well as an overview of the importance of trust-based partnerships in such
efforts, see generally DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD Cops: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE
POLICING (2005).
39. Jeff Kearns, PBS, Frontline, The Enemy Within, Engaging the Muslim Community
(Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/reality/muslim.html.
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effort to create positive relationships between law enforcement and
American Muslims would begin not on a blank slate, but against less-thanpositive experiences. Efforts to build relationships came against the
background of arrests of many hundreds of Muslims by the FBI after 9/11
on immigration and petty criminal charges, because the authorities
suspected the arrestees-without evidence-of connection to the attacks
The government detained these
or potential terrorist activity."
individuals, often for weeks or months and in severe conditions, and
denied some of them access to lawyers and family members. 41 The
government then kept them confined under a "hold until cleared" policy,
effectively turning the presumption of innocence on its head. 42 The FBI
followed this with a program of "voluntary" interviews with thousands of
young men from Muslim countries to ask whether they had any
involvement in terrorism or had any information that might assist the
authorities.43
40. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES
IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ArACKS 1 (2003)

(detailing how law enforcement officials had detained, at least for questioning, more than
1200 citizens and aliens nationwide and how many of the individuals questioned were
subsequently released without being charged with a criminal or immigration offense),
availableatwww.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney Gen. of the U.S. to All U.S.
Attorneys and All Members of the Anti-terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001) (setting
guidelines for interviews regarding international terrorism), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/dag/readingroom/terrorism2.htm. See also HARRIS, supra note 38, at 9-12
(describing the interviews and the harsh criticism they inspired from local police and former
federal law enforcement officials). It seems unlikely that such an effort would uncover
valuable information. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 38, at 174 (quoting an attorney who
represented several interviewees as saying, "To ask [someone] whether you advocate
terrorism? What kind of jackass would say yes?"); Jim McGee, Ex-FBI Officials Criticize

Tactics on Terrorism;Detention of Suspects Not Effective, They Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
2001, at Al (quoting a former high-ranking FBI official as saying that the interviews were
likely to produce nothing more than "the recipe to Mom's chicken soup"). However, a
report by Justice Department officials to then-Attorney General John Ashcroft said that
the program helped disrupt potential terrorist activities and also led to meaningful
investigative leads. Memorandum from Kenneth L. Wainstein, Dir., Executive Office for
U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice 5-7 (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://
www.scribd.com/doc/17819481TS-B61-VIP-Fdr-22602-Wainstein-Memo-Re-Final-Reporton-Interview-Project-224. But these officials offered no proof of these assertions; two years
later, neither the Department of Justice nor the FBI had bothered to analyze the data from
the interviews and had no plans to do so. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELAND
SECURITY: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11,

2001, at 15-16 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03459.pdf. From their
perspective, people within the Muslim community saw the effort as "'one of the most
damaging [policies] we've seen"' because it spread fear and confusion in Muslim
communities, which might have had the perverse result of making Muslims hesitate to come
forward with important information when they did have it. KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 2-3
(quoting Hussein Ibish, executive director of the Hala Salaam Maksoud Foundation for
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These post-9/11 actions and others by the government thus make it
much more difficult for law enforcement to create strong relationships
with Muslim communities because they have stimulated not trust in, but
fear of, federal law enforcement. A nationwide study in 2006 by the Vera
Institute of Justice showed just how deep the gulf between Muslim
communities and federal law enforcement has become. The study, funded
by the National Institute of Justice and performed over a two-year period,
revealed that Arab Americans feared the intrusion of federal policies and
practices even more than hate crimes or acts of violence." These findings
show just how difficult it will be for law enforcement to secure positive
relations with Muslims.45
To make matters worse, recall that many Muslims immigrated to the
United States from countries that functioned as police states, such as Iraq,
Syria, Egypt, and Iran. Individuals from such countries would almost
certainly begin any relationship with the police or government officials
with a presumption of suspicion. In their native countries, a knock on the
door of one's home or business from police or equivalent officials struck
terror into the heart, and every whispered conversation discussing the state
or its leadership held the potential for victimization by an informant. This
made distrust of police endemic in these communities, and the habits and
reflexes of mind learned in such an environment would undoubtedly come
with immigrants from those places.46
But in spite of these obstacles, law enforcement and security officials
clearly see the imperative of building, maintaining, and sustaining
relationships with their Muslim communities. And this is no accident: they
understand that essential rewards can flow from these efforts.
Constructing and maintaining these partnerships is absolutely necessary
for police/citizen communication; without ongoing, trust-based
relationships, fewer avenues and opportunities exist for communication.
And less communication means less intelligence will come to the police
from those living and working in the community. Again, this insight comes
Arab-American Leadership).
44. NICOLE J. HENDERSON,

CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIz, NAOMI F. SUGIE & JOEL MILLER,
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ARAB AMERICAN COMMUNITY
RELATIONSHIPS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: ENGAGEMENT IN A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY 13

(2006), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=147/Arab%2BAmerican%2B
Community%2BRelations.pdf.
45. Fortunately, the study also shows that Arab American communities have
significantly more trust in and better relationships with their local police departments than
the FBI or other federal agencies and that efforts to improve relations between these
communities and law enforcement are often effective in reducing tensions. Id. at 21.
46. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 16 ("Palestinian, Syrian and Egyptian immigrants have
long engaged in their own form of surveillance, trying to discern the spies in their midst. It
is a habit imported from the countries they left behind, where informers for the security
services were common and political freedoms curtailed.").
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directly from community policing. Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie
Bucqueroux, two of the foremost champions of community policing,
explain that when law-abiding people in communities work with the police
and participate in the process of law enforcement, as successful community
policing requires, they become much more likely to support enforcement
efforts.4 7 And among the most important kinds of support is supplying law
enforcement with information. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux call this "the
lifeblood of policing. ,48 "Without the facts," they assert, "police officers
cannot solve problems." 49 Thus the community policing approach brings
law enforcement "more and better information" because officials and the
community have already established a bond of trust.so
Given existing terrorist threats against the United States, nothing
trumps the need for intelligence. And the intelligence we need concerning
the danger posed by an exceptionally tiny number of radicalized Muslims
can almost certainly come from only one source: Muslim communities
themselves. Muslims, especially immigrants, will know the relevant
language, people, and cultural nuances in ways that will likely enable them
to tell the crackpot and the crank from the potentially dangerous person.
This makes our Muslim communities essential partners for law
Without engagement and cooperation with Muslim
enforcement."1
communities in this country, law enforcement at all levels "believe they
will never penetrate the world of homegrown Islamic extremists and
potential terrorists the officials are convinced is out there."52 And, to some
degree, this idea has penetrated the highest levels of the federal
government. According to Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security under President Bush, "we must build a new level of
confidence and trust among the American Muslim community, who are
critical partners in protecting our community." 53 Other government

47. ROBERT TROJANOWICZ & BONNIE BUCQUEROUX, COMMUNITY POLICING: A
COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE, at xiii-xv, 11, 12 (1990).
48. Id. at 11.

49. Id.
50. Id.at 12.
51. See, e.g., Kearns, supra note 39 (quoting Deborah Ramirez of Northeastern
University as stating that Muslim communities are "'our best allies' in the fight against
terrorism and that "'[w]ithout them we are flying blind'). See also KAPLAN, supra note 9,
at 2 (quoting Steven Simon, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, as stating
that Muslim Americans are "'a community, ultimately, on whom we will rely for our
security"').

52. Karen DeYoung, Distrust Hinders FBI in Outreach to MusEms, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 2007, at Al.

53. Homeland Security: The Next 5 Years: Hearing Before the S Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 64 (2006) (statement of
Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony-1158336548990.shtm.
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officials both in the United States 54 and abroad5 agree.
Thus, despite considerable impediments, the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies have endeavored to build connections and bridges
with Muslims. "We're spending more money on outreach... so we can
say: 'Please help us. Please look for people who are turning away from
institutions to extremism. Please be our eyes and ears,"' said Philip Mudd,
deputy director of the FBI's National Security Branch." Obtaining
intelligence on the terrorist threat requires building a close relationship
with Muslim communities and their leaders."
Local police have also worked hard to build these relationships, and
perhaps no department has done more than the New York Police
Department (NYPD). For example, as of May 2007, the NYPD had
twenty people acting as liaisons to immigrant communities, especially
Muslim communities, working to "make inroads and foster trust in the
city's kaleidoscopic and widening sea of immigrants, many of them
distrustful of the police."" The liaison personnel seem to understand what
they and the NYPD face. As one liaison commented, "We're aware
there's a fear factor; the question is, how do we bridge that?"" Given the
special importance of police/Muslim relations to questions of security
against terrorist attacks, the NYPD has hired two Muslim civilians as
liaisons specifically "to do outreach and to train the department's officers
in matters of cultural sensitivity." 60
Despite the substantial residue of mistrust accumulated through events
54. See, e.g., Richard A. Clarke, Finding the Sleeper Cells,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 16 (quoting former National Counterterrorism Coordinator for the
National Security Council stating that alliances with American Muslim communities must
be their first priority if they want to head off sleeper cells); Vincent Cannistraro, Former
Chief of Operations & Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency Counterterrorism Ctr., and
Former Special Assistant for Intelligence, Office of the Sec'y of Def., Remarks at the 26th
National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy (Apr. 3, 2003) ("[W]hen we
alienate communities, particularly immigrant communities, we undermine the very basis of
our intelligence collection abilities because we need to have the trust and cooperation of
people in those communities.").
55. See, e.g., Glenn Frankel, Londoners Warly Resuming Their Lives, WASH. POST,
July 10, 2005, at A17 (quoting Sir Ian Blair, head of the London Metropolitan Police and
leader of the investigation of the transit bombings in London in the summer of 2005, who
said, "It is not the police and it is not the intelligence services who will defeat terrorism; it is
communities who defeat terrorism.").
56. DeYoung, supra note 52. Interestingly, Mudd was a career CIA officer before
coming to the FBI. Id.
57. See generally id. (describing FBI efforts to reach out to Muslims in order to
prevent homegrown terrorism).
58. Cara Buckley, Liaisons Bear Message from the Police: Trust Us, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2007, at B1 (also noting that the NYPD had added eight new liaisons in a year and
a half).
59. Id.
6 0. Id.
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like the post-9/11 roundups and the "voluntary" interviews,'6 1 most Muslim
communities have begun working with law enforcement.6 2 They have
supplied invaluable anti-terrorism information and cooperation-witness
the Lackawanna and Toledo cases. Muslim citizens and community
members have also joined task forces, advisory boards, and multicultural
councils with law enforcement, and they have taught classes for police in
the basics of Islam and Middle Eastern cultures.63 They have also served
as liaisons between their communities, the FBI, and their local police
departments'-all in an effort to make our country safe from the threat of
terrorism.
Overall, the point could not be simpler or more central to our safety.
To protect ourselves against terrorism, we must have the best intelligence
about what happens on our own soil. That information will most likely
come from our Muslim communities because they will have the contacts,
the language skills, and the cultural understandings necessary to know this
information. And getting this information communicated to our law
enforcement agencies depends on the existence of solid, trust-based
relationships between law enforcement and these communities.
B.

Informants and the Perceptionof Betrayal

During the last two years, efforts to cement productive relationships
between law enforcement agencies and Muslim communities have
undergone severe challenges created by law enforcement itself. This has
happened because trials of terrorism cases have revealed that law
61. See, e.g., DeYoung, supra note 52 (asserting that many incidents "have regularly
challenged the fragile cooperation that law enforcement and Muslims nationwide are
struggling to create after years of mutual suspicion").
62. See, e.g., Michael P. Downing, Policing Terronsm in the United States: The Los
Angeles Police Department's Convergence Strategy,POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 2009 (describing
the "Muslim Forum," a recent initiative of the Los Angeles Police Department wherein the
Department meets with local Muslim community leaders to discuss how better to serve and
protect their communities), available at http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/
index.cfm?fuseaction=display arch&article id=1729&issueid=22009; Press Release, Ctr.
for Homeland Def. & Sec., Jensen's Community Policing Efforts Build Partnerships with
Muslim Community (Nov. 2009) (reporting on the St. Paul, Minnesota, Police
Department's Muslim Community Outreach program, begun in 2005), available at
http://www.chds.us/?press/release&id=2302; FBI-Muslim Cooperation Resulted in Arrests
(NPR Weekend Edition radio broadcast Dec. 12, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=121374117&ft=1&f=7.
63. See HARRIS, supra note 38, at 40-41, 46-47, 50-52 (detailing police and Muslim
partnerships in Seattle, Wichita, and Chicago); DeYoung, supra note 52 (explaining how, at
the invitation of local law enforcement departments, Muslims have "join[ed] multicultural
advisory boards and [taught] classes in the basics of Islam to agents and police").
64. E.g., Robin Shulman, Liaison Strives to Bridge Police, Muslim Cultures, WASH.
POST, Jan. 24, 2007, at A2 (explaining how a Muslim man of Turkish descent serves as parttime civilian liaison to the NYPD, both in order "to redeem the name of the police
department to Muslims and the reputation of Islam to police officers").
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enforcement has inserted informants into the Muslim community, often in
mosques, to spy on people and to gather information.65
The use of informants by law enforcement is certainly nothing new;
the Supreme Court itself ruled on the constitutional status and regulation
of informants more than thirty years ago.66 Thus, one could not feel
surprised that police agencies have used informants to gather information
on the threat of terrorism. However, when Muslims who had worked with
the FBI and their local police departments learned of the informants, they
felt not just surprise, but betrayal."
The experience of Muslims in New York City provides a particularly
telling example of these feelings of betrayal. In the wake of September
2001, many Muslim leaders joined not just the FBI but their own NYPD to
form an alliance against extremists in their communities.68 In the spring of
2006, however, a trial began in New York City for a young Muslim,
Shahawar Matin Siraj, whom the authorities accused of planning to bomb
the Herald Square subway station in Manhattan.69 In the course of the
trial, testimony revealed that the NYPD had made extensive use of two
informants in the case.70 Many Muslims felt bitter that the NYPD, which
had courted them as allies, had placed informants in their community, even
in their houses of worship, and they saw it "as proof that the authoritiesboth in New York and around the nation-have been aggressive, even
underhanded in their approach to Muslims."7 1 Those angered felt that the
NYPD had talked to them out of both sides of its mouth. On the one
hand, they were asked to become the NYPD's partners; on the other, the
NYPD obviously had not trusted them, since it sent in spies. "This is a real
setback to the bridge building," said Michael Dibarro, a Jordanian
immigrant and a former clergy liaison with the NYPD. "We had
meaningful meetings. We thought we were going somewhere [positive
with our relations with the NYPD]," he said.72
The same cycle has also played out elsewhere since 2001. For
example, in Lodi, California, a town with a substantial number of Pakistani
immigrants, the FBI used an informant to gather evidence against a

65. See Kearns, supra note 39.
66. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area are discussed in detail in Section II,
infra.
67. See Kearns, supranote 39.
68. See Elliott, supra note 16 (describing how, over time, "a necessary, if
uncomfortable relationship emerged between Muslims and the police watching over
them").
69. Id.
7 0. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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feckless young Pakistani man and his father, an ice cream truck driver."
There had been considerable hard work in Lodi to build law enforcement
connections with the Pakistani Muslim community, but the news of the
informant's work in Lodi and the bringing of terrorism-related charges
against the man and his father based on the informant's work shattered
these efforts.74 According to Taj Khan, one of the leaders in Lodi's
Muslim community who has worked hardest to create and solidify positive
relationships between Pakistani Muslims and police in Lodi, "We were
making tremendous progress in this community, but we've been
significantly set back." The damage may be impossible to repair. Khan
stressed, "You can't exaggerate the damage done [to our efforts] by the
FBI's investigation here.""
All of this reveals the essential conflict that arises with the use of
informants in our current political climate. We know that we must have
the cooperation and trust of Muslim communities to get the intelligence we
need in order to have the best possible chance of preventing a terrorist
attack. But if law enforcement makes use of informants too often or too
casually, it risks undermining the very trust of the Muslim communities
that law enforcement needs and that we all, ultimately, depend upon for
our safety. If we are not careful, we will end up in a situation that hurts
everyone. Some Muslims will, quite understandably, begin to distrust or
resent law enforcement, or fear contact with it. This will likely make all of
us less safe, because less information on potential threats may flow to the
police. At the same time, this also weakens the standing and credibility of
those moderate voices within the Muslim community who favor working
with police and other authorities.
II.
How THE LAW REGULATES THE USE OF INFORMANTS: (ALMOST)

ANYTHING GOES

A complete understanding of the context in which law enforcement
chooses to use informants requires an appreciation of the law surrounding
the use of this tactic. Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment does
not restrain police when they use informants; other methods of restraint,
such as the defense of entrapment and civil litigation, have also proven
ineffective.
73. PBS, Frontline, The Enemy Within, Interview: McGregor W. Scott, (Oct. 10,

2006),

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/interviews/scott.html

[hereinafter Interview: McGregor W. Scott].
74. See Kearns, supra note 39 (describing how many people within Lodi's large
Pakistani community are now skeptical of outsiders and reluctant to talk for fear of scrutiny

from federal authorities).
7 5. Id.
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The Fourth Amendment: No Limits, andHow We Came to "Assume
the Risk" That Every PersonIs a Government Informant

The Supreme Court ruled on the use of informants in a series of cases
in the 1960s and early 1970s. At its inception, this line of decisions focused
on the dangers posed by then-new technologies for electronic
surveillance.76 By the time of the final decision in this line of cases,
however, the Court had effectively created a broad standard for the use of
informants-one that allowed the government to place and make use of
informants at any point, and for any reason, without judicial supervision.
In Lopez v. UnitedStates, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim that
the surreptitious tape recording of a conversation amounted to a seizure
that violated the Fourth Amendment." In doing so, the Court concluded
that the defendant had risked that someone-here, the agent-might
record a conversation he assumed would stay secret. "We think the risk
that [defendant] took in offering a bribe to [the IRS agent] fairly included
the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by
faultless memory or mechanical recording."79 In dissent, Justice Brennan
objected to the surreptitious nature of the surveillance and denounced its
possible chilling effect on free speech," but, like the majority, he also
discussed what the agent had done in the language of risk."
The idea of "assumption of the risk"-a concept borrowed from the

76. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
78. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). The defendant in Lopez tried to bribe
an IRS agent, who tape recorded the conversation between them. Id. at 430-32. The
defendant objected to the government's use of the recorded conversation at trial, arguing
that the agent gained access to the defendant's office by deception and had thus "seized"
his words illegally. Id at 437. In dismissing the defendant's claim, the Court relied on an
earlier case, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), in which the Court upheld the
use of a secret microphone carried by an informant to transmit his conversations with a
defendant to a police officer not on the premises. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438 & n.10.
79. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439.
80. Id, at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I believe that there is a grave danger of
chilling all private, free, and unconstrained communication if secret recordings, turned over
to law enforcement officers by one party to a conversation, are competent evidence of any
self-incriminating statements the speaker may have made."). But see Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), a case decided just three years later involving a narcotics
purchase by an undercover police officer, in which the Court indicated that the use of
electronic surveillance was not the majority's central concern in these cases, even if it was
Justice Brennan's. Using an informant, even one who does not have any electronic
listening or recording device, the Court held, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See
generally id.

81. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The risk of being overheard by
an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with
whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of
risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.").
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law of torts'-seems a curious way to discuss the use of informants.
Moreover, adopting this "assumption of the risk" view conceals a
significant conceptual question that the Court did nothing to answer: even
if we do, in some sense, assume the risk that anyone with whom we discuss
private matters might reveal them to others, do we also assume the risk
that they would take our words to the government, for purposes of
investigation and prosecution?
Without ever fully addressing this question, the Court cemented the
"assumption of the risk" theory into Fourth Amendment law on
informants in Hoffa v. United States, in which the government used an
informant, whom the defendant's friends had let into the defendant's hotel
suite, to gather evidence." The Court found that "no interest legitimately
protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved .... [Hoffa], in a word,
was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying upon his
misplaced confidence that [the informant] would not reveal his
To reinforce the point, the majority quoted Justice
wrongdoing."'
Brennan's dissent in Lopez to make clear that the risk of betrayal by an
informer "'is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is
the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak."' 8
The Court further solidified its doctrine on informants in 1971 in
United States v. White, 6 a case that involved electronic eavesdropping
carried out by an informant without a warrant.87 If any doubts remained
about whether the Fourth Amendment required warrants in order to use
informants, White put them to rest for good:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he
sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very
probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or

82. E.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d. 696 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff was
barred from recovery for his sports injury because he assumed a known risk in playing
touch football); Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929)
("One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are
obvious and necessary...."). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS' HORNBOOK ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 211 (2000).
83. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966). The defendant argued that the
informant's deception (i.e., the informant never said that he came not as a trusted friend
but as an informant) "vitiated" any consent that the defendant may have given for the
informant's entry into his hotel rooms. Id.at 300. Therefore, listening to the defendant's
statements amounted to "an illegal 'search' for verbal evidence." Id.
84. Id.at 302.
85. Id.at 303 (quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. 427,465 (Brennan J., dissenting)).
86. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
87. The informant did not testify at trial; instead, government agents, who listened to
the electronically-gathered communication between defendant and the informant, told the
jury what the defendant had said. Id. at 746-47.
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allays them, or risks what doubts he has, the riskis his.88
Put another way, the "assumption of the risk" rule made any real
Fourth Amendment analysis within the context of the use of informants
If one must risk betrayal any time one has any
superfluous.
communication with another person, the idea of police investigation
tempered by the standard of probable cause or scrutinized by a judicial
officer in a request for a warrant never enters the discussion. After all, the
Fourth Amendment only regulates government conduct-in other words,
the actions of the police.89 Though most informants certainly act as agents
of the police, the risk that the defendant's actions will be betrayed to the
government is not the result of action by the police or their agents; rather,
it simply inheres in the risky actions of the defendant. Because intelligence
gathered by informants is categorized as a result of assumed risk rather
than a result of police action, the Fourth Amendment does not regulate
the gathering of such evidence. Police need no warrants to use informants,
and their actions need not measure up to any standard (such as probable
cause). Thus the police may use informants as they wish in any case at any
stage prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings,9 0 with none of the
usual types of judicial supervision.
B.

OtherLimitationson Government Conduct with Respect to
Informants

Lopez, Lewis, Hoffa, and White make clear that the government may

use informants as it chooses in the investigation phase of any given case,
88. Id. at 752 (emphases added).
89. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) ("The Fourth Amendment gives
protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies .... ).
90. Under the Sixth Amendment, the government may not use statements deliberately
elicited by informants after the initiation of judicial proceedings, when the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205
(1964) ("'Any secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding of the
indictment, without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravenes the
basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of
persons charged with crime."' (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y.
1971))). The Court has held that this protection extends to jailhouse informants' deliberate
elicitation of statements from defendants, United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980),
except in cases where the jailhouse informant is merely a passive listener who does nothing
to elicit the statements, Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). Defendants may also have
a defense under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the use of
evidence that was obtained by an informant who herself used coercion or its equivalent to
elicit a statement from the defendant. See Arizona v. Fuhinante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)
(finding that because informant induced defendant's confession by promising him
protection from credible threats of physical violence in prison, the statement was coerced
and therefore obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause).
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without any Fourth Amendment-based justification (e.g., meeting a
standard of probable cause) or judicial supervision (e.g., obtaining a
warrant). Nonetheless, there exist other plausible legal avenues for
regulating informant use. For example, during any trial, the defendant
may raise substantive criminal law defenses regarding the use of
informants. Specifically, she may argue that the government entrapped
her or that the government engaged in conduct so outrageous as to violate
the Due Process Clause. She can also argue that the government's conduct
creates civil liability.
1. Entrapment

The defense of entrapment may serve as a brake on some types of
informant behavior, but only to a limited extent. In the words of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, entrapment draws a line "between the trap for the
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." 9 1 Entrapment law
prohibits the former, but allows the latter. To tell whether any given
defendant is an unwary innocent or an unwary criminal, "the thrust of the
entrapment defense [focuses] on the intent or predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime."' This point has always remained central:
as the law has stood for at least thirty-five years, a defendant predisposed
to commit the crime cannot claim entrapment simply because the
government supplied the opportunity for the defendant to commit the
crime. Courts look not at the fact that the government has dirtied its
hands by involving itself in criminal activity, but at whether the defendant
had the inclination to become involved in the crime irrespective of the
government's actions.9 3 Most defendants will not benefit from the
entrapment defense if they participated in the criminal activity prior to the
91. Sherman v. United States, 365 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
92. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973).
93. See id. at 434 ("[It does not] seem particularly desirable for the law to grant
complete immunity from prosecution to one who himself planned to commit a crime, and
then committed it, simply because government undercover agents subjected him to
inducements which might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not so
predisposed."). The Supreme Court qualified this rule in 1992 in Jacobson v. UnitedStates,
503 U.S. 540 (1992), a case in which postal inspectors and members of the U.S. Customs
Service used bogus offers of illegal child pornography to contact a man who had purchased
such items one time in the past, before Congress made possession of this type of material
criminal. When the man ordered and received an illegal pornographic magazine in
response to one of the government's decoy offers, officers arrested him. Id. at 542-47. The
Court, which had previously held to the predisposition idea as the cornerstone of the
entrapment law, qualified it in Jacobson by adding another proof element. When law
enforcement "has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is
at issue . . . the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government
agents." Id. at 548-49 (citing United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
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informant becoming involved, or showed any inclination toward it.
Even if informants encouraged the defendant's criminal behavioregged them on, even pushed them to act-the defendant's entrapment
defense may not be successful. Recent terrorism prosecutions involving
informants make this clear. For example, in the prosecution of Shahawar
Matin Siraj for planning to bomb the Herald Square subway station in
New York City, the informant, Osama Eldawoody, deliberately attempted
to get Siraj to take the very type of actions that prosecutors said he
planned to do. According to the testimony at the trial, Eldawoody, an
informant for the NYPD, made persistent efforts to arouse anti-American
feelings in Siraj. He allegedly showed Siraj dozens of inflammatory
photographs, including images of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American
soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison94 and a video of the fatal shooting of a
twelve-year-old boy who died in Gaza during an Israeli-Palestinian battle.'
According to Siraj, the informant also talked to Siraj about blowing up
buildings on Wall Street and convinced him that religious leaders had
issued a fatwa-a religious edict-that allowed the killing of American
soldiers, police officers, or FBI agents.96 The facts of the Siraj case paint a
picture of the defendant as a suggestible young man-his own lawyer
called him a "dimwit" 97-who was led into making grandiose statements by
a desire to impress the informant, a man twice his age. When the talk
turned to causing bloodshed, Siraj testified that he broke off the
discussion, telling the informant that he needed to ask his mother's
permission to participate.
Siraj's lawyers mounted an entrapment defense, but it failed. The
evidence the government offered at trial indicated that, long before ever
meeting the informant, Siraj had made some statements that indicated his
belief in the legitimacy and desirability of violent terrorist action against
Americans and Israelis; the court allowed the jury to hear evidence of
94. William K. Rashbaum, Defendant Says Police Informer PushedHim into Bomb
Plot, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Rashbaum, Defendant Says] (reporting
that informant showed defendant "dozens of images, including pictures of prisoners being
abused at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq"); William K. Rashbaum, Terror Case May Offer
Clues into Police Use of Informants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, at B1 (reporting defense
charges that informant "goaded" defendant into involvement in the bombing plot by
showing him inflammatory pictures of Abu Ghraib abuses).
95. Rashbaum, Defendant Says, supranote 94.

96. Id.
97. John Marzulli, Herald Square Bomb Plotter Gets 30 Years, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 9, 2007 (reporting that defense counsel stated that his client was "a dimwit who was
manipulated by a crafty paid informer trying to impress his police handlers").
98. Id. ("I told [the informant], 'I don't want to do it.' . . . I told him I wanted to ask
my mother's permission."). This may not be quite so outlandish a statement as it first
appears. To participate in what is sometimes called non-defensive jihad, the person must
obtain the permission of parents. See MAID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF
ISLAM 86 (1955).
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these statements to rebut the defense contention that the defendant had no
predisposition to commit the crime.9 9 Jurors indicated after the trial that
the actions of the informant were beside the point; rather, as entrapment
law requires, they looked for evidence that the informant had first
suggested the violence-that the idea of bombing the Herald Square
station "had not originated with Mr. Siraj."1" Since they did not hear any
such evidence, they rejected the defense of entrapment.'o' According to
one juror, "to prove entrapment you had to show clear evidence that [the
action] was initiated by the informant, that he persuaded [the defendant]
to do this, and the [defendant] was not ready and willing to do this.""
Without that kind of evidence, the jurors said, an entrapment defense
failed even if the informant had plainly pushed Siraj.103
99. William K. Rashbaum, Trial Spotlights Undercover Contact with Bomb Plot

Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at B2 (reporting that court allowed government to offer
testimony of undercover detective who had contact with defendant approximately one year
before defendant met informant with whom he formed bombing plot, during which contacts
defendant expressed approval of suicide bombings by Palestinians against Israelis and the
hope that "'America will be attacked very soon').
100. See Jennifer 8. Lee, Entrapment Evidence Lacking, Jurors Say, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2006, at B7.
101. See id. (quoting jurors as saying that the defendant advanced insufficient evidence
of entrapment for the jury to accept the defense).
102. Id.
103. See id. (quoting a juror as saying, "He could have been entrapped back then. We
don't have the evidence to prove it at that point."). The conviction of Hamid Hayat, the
young man from Lodi, California, is another revealing example of the sorts of actions by
informants allowed under the entrapment doctrine. Following the arrests of Hayat and his
father, many community members believed that a man who had befriended the suspects
was a federal informant. See Demian Bulwa, Muslims in Lodi Believe Mystery Man Who
Spoke of Jihad Was a FederalMole in TerrorInvestigation,S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2005, at

Al ("Community members said [the man] ... sometimes spoke of 'jihad' in what they now
believe was an attempt to get others to express radical sentiments."). See also Rone
Tempest, FBIInformer Begins His Testimony in TerrorTrial,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at
B1 (stating that Lodi residents who had contact with the putative informant described him
as "often an instigator, asking young men about waging jihad and encouraging travelers to
Pakistan to bring back firebrand speeches and extremist documents"). That the man was
an informant was confirmed in the trial, during which the man testified. Don Thompson,
FBI Informant'sFocus Shifted from Mosque to School in Lodi Probe,MERCED SUN-STAR,

Mar. 3, 2006, at 3. The informant's testimony made clear that the informant repeatedly
attempted to press Hayat into action. See id. (recounting that in June 2003 the informant
repeatedly pressed Hayat to attend a terrorist training camp and expressed exasperation
when Hayat said he could not do so because the camps no longer operated after the 2001
terrorist attacks). The informant would not accept any "excuse" from the defendant and
berated him furiously. "'You're just sitting around doing nothing.. .. You f---ing sleep for
half a day. You wake up. You light a f---ing cigarette. You eat. You sleep again. That's
all you do. A loafer guy,"' the informant said. Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have
Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 16. When Hayat asked the informant
what he should do, the informant said, "'You sound like a f---ing broken bitch. Come on.
Be a man. Do something,"' the informant implored him. Id "'When I come to Pakistan
and I see you, I'm going to f---ing force you, get you from your throat and f---ing throw you
in the madrassa."' Id In another call to Pakistan, the informant, who "had long been
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As the Siraj case-as well as more run-of-the-mill cases"-illustrate,
the defense of entrapment rarely results in an acquittal for the defendant.
The defense is simply too narrowly focused on the state of mind of the
defendant to make much of a difference in most cases.o Since it rarely
succeeds, entrapment will do little if anything to restrain the government's
use of informants.
2. Outrageous Government Conduct
Another defense, related to entrapment, examines whether the
government's investigative efforts went too far in an effort to secure a
conviction. This idea, usually referred to as the "outrageous government
conduct" defense, focuses not on the defendant and her predisposition to
commit the crime, but on whether the conduct of the government violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States
v. Russell, Justice Rehnquist explained that the outrageous government
conduct defense would present a court "with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking the judicial
processes to obtain a conviction.""' It is worth noting that the Court
described this defense as one that the Court "may some day" see, but had

pushing Hamid [Hayat] to get involved in radical Islamic activities," asserted strongly that
Hayat had a duty to join a terrorist training camp. James Bamford, Looking Beneath the
Surface of a Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at E8 (reviewing the documentary
"The Enemy Within," which aired on October 10, 2006, on Frontline, a PBS program).
.'No, no, no vacation, man,"' the informant said in the recorded phone conversation. Id.
"'Ifyou-you're sitting there, in Pakistan. You told me: "I'm going to a camp. I'll do that."
You're sitting idle. You're wasting time."' Id. Despite this pushing and pulling of the
defendant by the government's informant, the jury convicted the defendant. Id.
104. Eg., United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that
defendants' initiation of contact with undercover agent shows they were not induced to
commit criminal activity). See also United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229-30
(3d Cir. 1998) (finding that defendant's continuing involvement in crime before agent
approached her meant that defense of entrapment would not prevent conviction).
105. The point here is quite simple: the law of entrapment does almost nothing to
protect defendants against significant government coercion (that is, pushing the defendant
toward the commission of a crime instead of simply providing her the opportunity to
commit the crime according to her own predisposition, unaffected by any government
pushing and pulling). For a deeper and more nuanced overview and critique of
entrapment, see generally Richard H. McAdams, The PoliticalEconomyof Entrapment,96
J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107 (2005) (arguing that the entrapment defense regulates
proactive undercover operations by which police manipulate the appearance of criminal
opportunities). See also Maura F.J. Whelan, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted)Temptation:
A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion
Requirement,133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (arguing that law enforcement officials should
be required to demonstrate reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaging in criminal
conduct before being authorized to test that individual's penchant for illegal transactions).
106. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
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not seen yet, including in the case before it. 10 7
In a subsequent case, the decisive concurring opinion of Justice Powell
emphasized the narrowness of the outrageous government conduct
doctrine.108 Cases, Powell said, "in which proof of predisposition is not
dispositive will be rare. Police overinvolvement in crime would have to
reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar
He stressed that, particularly in offenses involving
conviction."'"
possession of contraband, courts should label law enforcement conduct
"outrageous" only reluctantly and should give extraordinary deference to
law enforcement. 1 o Lower courts have responded accordingly, construing
the outrageous government conduct defense narrowly and seldom finding
that it prevents conviction, even with evidence of considerable government
involvement in criminal activity."' As one commentator said, "it appears
that it will be the rare case where the government's conduct in supervising
or operating an informant warrants dismissal of an indictment" on the
basis of outrageous government conduct.112
3.

Civil Litigation

Civil litigation represents another possible strategy to challenge the
use of informants. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
107. Id. ("The instant case is distinctly not of that breed.").
108. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 491-95 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
109. Id at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
110. See id. ("Police overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable
level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction.").
111. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the
government's "Abscam" sting operation, in which government operatives posed as Arab
sheiks willing to pay bribes for "help" with immigration problems, was not outrageous
government conduct violating the Due Process Clause); United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d
272 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that Due Process Clause was not violated even though an
informant participated in a conspiracy to extort money and keep proceeds for himself and
law enforcement officials were aware of the informant's criminal intentions).
112. Amanda J. Schreiber, Dealing with the Devil An Examination of the FBI's
TroubledRelationship with Its ConfidentialInformants,34 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 301,
348 (2001). See also Daniel V. Ward, Confidential Informants in National Security
Investigations, 47 B.C. L. REV. 627, 635 (2006) (saying that the Second Circuit "has
expressed reluctance to dismiss indictments" based on the outrageous government conduct
defense). According to one of the most comprehensive examinations of the use of
informants to date, "Courts rarely consider the official use of informants to be outrageous,
but it occasionally happens in extreme cases." ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING:
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 61 (2009). Natapoff cites
as standing virtually alone the case of UnitedStates v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), in
which the govermnent's informant proposed the creation and operation of a drug-making
lab to a defendant not involved with any such ongoing operation, and in which the
government supplied the essential core ingredient for manufacture, obtained the lab
location, supplied glassware, and made other chemicals easily available. This, the court
said, showed that "the governmental involvement in the criminal activities of this case has
reached 'a demonstrable level of outrageousness."' Id at 380.
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Bureau of Narcotics,a case involving a Fourth Amendment challenge, the
Supreme Court gave individuals the right to bring suit in federal court
when federal actors violate their constitutional rights during a criminal
investigation, even if the government ultimately brings no criminal
charges."' Bivens stands as the analogue to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute
that created a federal right to sue state and local government officials who
violate the constitutional rights of citizens while acting under color of state
law.114 In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, plaintiffs brought numerous lawsuits
to address their claims of illegal surveillance and disruption of political
groups by police."' Federal courts showed some willingness to find for
these plaintiffs, perhaps influenced by the revelations of large-scale federal
wrongdoing in domestic intelligence gathering uncovered in congressional
investigations led by Senator Frank Church." 6
113. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a civil action for deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws).
115. According to one commentator, plaintiffs brought lawsuits against approximately
seventy-five police agencies for illegal surveillance in the decade between 1964 and 1974.
John H.F. Shattuck, Tilting at the Surveillance Apparatus, 1 Civ. LIBERTIES REV. 59, 60
(1974). In many cases, the surveillance targeted political and social action groups. Id This
included the Handschu case in New York, which resulted in a consent decree, see
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1389-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(summarizing the consent decree), and the "Red Squad" case brought by plaintiffs in
Chicago, which likewise ended with a consent decree, Alliance to End Repression v. City of
Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 800-01 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining case's history and discussing
pertinent provisions of consent decree). Similar controversies arose in Los Angeles,
Detroit, and Seattle, among other cities. See generallyPaul G. Chevigny, Politicsand Law
in the Control of Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 767-82 (1984) (discussing cases
that challenged police surveillance of political and social organizations in Los Angeles,
Seattle, and Detroit).
116. See SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS (Comm. Print 1976); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED
STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS (Comm.
Print 1976) (describing how the government often undertook secret surveillance of citizens
on the basis of their political beliefs); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., HEARINGS, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS (Comm. Print 1975).

This era of wrongdoing by the CIA received new scrutiny in 2007, when Michael Hayden,
then the relatively new director of the Agency, made the decision to release the so-called
"family jewels" documents-internal memoranda prepared in the 1970s detailing the
Agency's many Cold War-era transgressions. See Karen DeYoung & Walter Pincus, CIA
Releases Files on Past Misdeeds, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at Al (reporting on the
hundreds of pages of decades-old documents declassified and released by the CIA and how
they "chronicle activities including assassination plans, illegal wiretaps and hunts for

spies"); Mark Mazzetti & Tim Weiner, Fileson Illegal Spying Show CIA. Skeletons from
Cold War, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at Al (describing how the papers "provide evidence
of paranoia and occasional incompetence as the agency began a string of illegal spying
operations in the 1960s and 1970s").
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Civil LitigationAgainst Police Departmentsfor Spying

Another legal strategy that has been employed, and with some success,
is suits against local police departments for illegal surveillance activities.
After suits in New York and Chicago, the cities' police departments
ultimately agreed to settlements that put them under consent decrees
supervised by the federal courts, tightly circumscribing their surveillance
activities, including the use of informants.
In Chicago, the Alliance to End Repression, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and others brought suits to end abuses of civil rights by
the so-called "Red Squad" of the Chicago Police Department, which had
actively spied upon allegedly subversive groups."'s The cases were
consolidated and eventually settled; as a result, a federal court began
supervision of the Chicago Police Department in 1982."9 In similar
circumstances in New York, a federal court began supervisions of the
NYPD in 1985 in the Handschu case.'2 0 Both the Chicago and New York
cases put restrictions on the use of surveillance, including the use of
informants, by these police departments, and required ongoing monitoring
of specified departmental activities.121 Since the settlements took the form
of federal court orders with continuing judicial oversight, the courts could
enforce the decrees with the contempt power.
Both the Chicago and New York consent decrees stayed in place for
almost two decades, but courts have lifted major elements of these orders
in the last few years. In the Chicago case, the Court of Appeals for the
117. This misconduct included the use of informants against law-abiding groups. For
example:
[D]uring the sixties, the unit launched a yearly average of one thousand intensive
political investigations of dissident groups and individuals and about six hundred
lesser probes .... Such investigations, at times, involved the use of undercover
agents to infiltrate the organizations. ... [A]s political ferment grew in the late
1960's, New York City's intelligence unit expanded beyond infiltrating
organizations and gathering information.. .. [I]informants and infiltrators were
used as agentsprovocateursto disrupt the activities of political organizations and
to facilitate the arrests of organizational activists. It was against this background
that the Handschucase was filed as a class action in 1971.
Police Surveillance of PoliticalActivity- The History and Current State of the Handschu
Decree: HearingBefore the New York Advisory Comm. to the United States Commission
on Civil Rights (May 21, 2003) (statement of Arthur N. Eisenberg), available at http://

www.nyclu.org/node/731.
118. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp 537, 541-44 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (describing history of the litigation and discovery collected against the City of
Chicago and the Chicago Police Department).
119. See id. at 549-51 (describing the terms of the settlement and the scope of the
injunction against the Chicago Police Department).
120. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div,, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(approving a settlement that dealt with the future use of collection, retention, and
dissemination of information by the NYPD), aff'd,787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986).
121. See id.at 1391-92; Alliance, 561 F. Supp. at 567, 568-69.
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Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court's decision and released the Chicago
Police Department from some of the more onerous obligations of the 1981
consent decree.12 2 Writing for the court, Judge Richard Posner first
asserted that federal courts should not remain supervisors of state and
local governmental agencies indefinitely under such consent decrees."
Second, Judge Posner said that the original decree had indeed protected
the First Amendment rights of citizens, but at too high a price in the
potential danger to public safety. The world had changed, with new
threats, especially "ideologically motivated terrorism," that might strike
both globally and locally.124 Unless the Chicago Police Department had
the increased flexibility it wanted, it could not keep the citizens of Chicago
safe. 125 Blending these federalism and public safety points, Posner said,
"To continue federal judicial micromanagement of local investigations of
domestic and international terrorist activities in Chicago is to undermine
the federal system and to trifle with the public safety."126
In the Handschu case in New York, a drastic reduction in the scope of
the consent decree came as a direct response to the terrorist attacks on the
city on September 11, 2001. In the wake of those events, the NYPD told
the supervising federal district judge that the mandatory guidelines had
become too onerous in light of the threat of international terrorism and
the increased surveillance needed to meet this challenge. 127 The judge
decided that these changed circumstances warranted a substantial scaling
back of the requirements of the decree because it "severely handicap[ped]
police efforts to gather and utilize information about potential terrorist

activity." 128
Just four years later, the Handschu plaintiffs went back to court, this
time to challenge the NYPD's routine videotaping of people at public
gatherings, without any indication that the people taped would engage in
unlawful activity.129 Judge Haight-the same judge who had lifted most of
122. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the consent decree would be modified to permit the police to protect public
safety by allowing them to keep tabs on potential terrorist groups).
123. See id. at 801 ("Federal decrees that hand ultimate control of state functions to
federal courts 'are not intended to operate in perpetuity."' (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991))).
124. Id,at 802.
125. See id. (describing how the decree rendered the police helpless to keep tabs on
"incipient terrorist groups"). Judge Posner's words about ideologically-driven terrorism
seem prescient: his decision regarding the consent decree came just months before the
attacks of September 11, 2001.
126. Id
127. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(outlining the NYPD's motion to modify the guidelines).
128. Id at 340.
129. See Jim Dwyer, Judge Says Police Violated Rules in Videotaping Public
Gatherings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at Al (reporting on a case challenging the
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the Handschu requirements just a few years before-issued an order
limiting the taping, but did not reimpose any stricter level of supervision.130
In the meantime, new revelations emerged in 2007: the NYPD engaged in
widespread surveillance, including the use of informants and undercover
police officers, against numerous activist groups around the country in the
run-up to the Republican National Convention, held in New York City in
132
2004.131 As of this writing, legal action in that matter remains pending.
Both the Alliance to End Repression case in Chicago and the

Handschu case in New York leave one with the impression that, while
litigation to rein in police use of informants remains a possibility, this path
seems, to put it mildly, less than promising. In today's post-9/11 climate, it
is hard to imagine a federal court issuing directives limiting police use of
surveillance activities like the planting of informants.
b) CivilLitigationAgainst the FederalGovernment's Use of
Informants

There is at least one other possibility for litigation against the use of
informants in houses of worship and other religious settings-a claim that
the use of this tactic would violate the First Amendment, because it would
chill the free exercise of religious belief and practice. Such a claim makes
perfect sense considering the real and tangible damage inflicted on
religious institutions when law enforcement agencies utilize informants in
these settings.133 But even proponents of First Amendment challenges to
the use of informants concede that such lawsuits would face formidable, if
not insurmountable, obstacles.'3 4 First, plaintiffs would have to show that
they have standing to sue, which requires (to start with) proof that they
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the government's
conduct.'3 5
videotaping practice).
130. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 475 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
131. See Jim Dwyer, City Police Spied Broadly Before G.O.P Convention, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, § 1, at 11 (detailing actions by NYPD officers against individuals and
groups all over the country dating back to 2003).
132. See, e.g., Schiller v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-07922, 2009 WL 497580
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2009) (involving thirty-seven cases that are part of a larger group of
cases relating to protests surrounding the 2004 Republican National Convention).
133. See infra Section III.B.3.
134. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 22, at 1237-42 (discussing the difficulties involved
in a First Amendment lawsuit challenging the use of informants).
135. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) ("[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III [of the U.S.
Constitution] requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
(quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
conduct of the defendant' .....
U.S. 91, 99 (1979))). Along with proof of real or threatened injury, plaintiffs would also
have to show that the injury comes from the challenged government action and that a
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Second, the question would become whether the government could
show an interest sufficient to justify its actions. As long as the government
bases its actions on policies that are "neutral and of general applicability,"
courts judge them under the highly deferential rational basis standard,
under which almost all government action withstands challenges.'
According to one commentator, under the rational basis standard, most
First Amendment lawsuits challenging the use of informants would have
"virtually no chance" to succeed.137 At least one such case made its way
through the federal courts in the past, and the result highlights the
difficulties a plaintiff would have to surmount.
During the 1980s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated
an investigation of the "Sanctuary Movement" at various churches in
Arizona, which allegedly assisted immigrants coming into the United
States illegally.'38 As part of the investigation, the government placed paid
informants into some of the churches.'39 The investigation resulted in
indictments of eleven leaders of the Sanctuary Movement on felony
charges; eight were ultimately convicted. 14 A number of the churches that
the government had spied on brought suit, arguing that both the use of
informants and the informants' actions in their churches chilled the
exercise of their religious freedom, observable in the form of, inter alia,
reduced membership, decreased contributions to the churches, and
cancellation of bible classes.14 ' The district court found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in
pertinent part;142 with regard to standing, the Ninth Circuit found that the
drop in church attendance made plaintiffs' injuries concrete enough, and
not merely speculative.'43 On remand, the district court decided that, while
favorable decision will likely redress the injury. Id In a closely related context, a federal
appeals court recently found that plaintiffs alleging that their communications with legal
clients, journalistic sources, and the like would suffer a chilling effect were found not to
have standing to stop the so-called "Terrorist Surveillance Program," under which the
National Security Agency tapped citizens' phones without warrants. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec.
Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
136. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Although the Smith
Court did not explicitly state that it was using a rational basis test, scholars have since
inferred that the Court was using such a test. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1240 (citing ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.3.1 (2d ed. 2002)).
137. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1240.
138. See Natalie Lile, The Rehgious Freedom RestorationAct: Could It Have Helped
the Sanctuary Movement?, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199, 201-03 (1996) (describing the

Sanctuary Movement and the subsequent INS investigation).
139. Id, at 203. The informants posed as church volunteers and attended and recorded
religious meetings. Id.
140. Id. at 207 n.76.
141. These claims were summarized in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520-22 (9th Cir. 1989).
142. Id.at 520.
143. Id, at 522. The government had attempted to rely on the Supreme Court's
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the chilling effect was real and the government must adhere to the scope of
the "invitation" that the informants received to participate in church
activities, the government need only have "a good faith purpose for the
subject investigation."'" Under this standard, plaintiffs in mosques in
which the government placed informants would have little with which to
work. In the present climate, with fervor against terrorism at a high point,
courts would likely have no trouble finding a "good faith purpose" for
government investigations. It would also be easy for informants to
perform actions within the scope of the "invitation" that mosques issue (in
theory) to members of the public to come and worship.
C

InternalRegulations

The regulation of the use of informants in religious institutions has
also taken the form of internal police agency regulation. Internal police
regulation can serve as an effective method of controlling police
behavior.145 The FBI, which has had internal regulations on the use of
informants for decades, makes a particularly pertinent example.
During the 1970s, congressional investigations led by Senator Frank
Church revealed a long pattern of abusive and illegal domestic surveillance
of political, religious, and social groups. According to committee findings,
"The Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens
on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no
threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power."46
Targets of illegal government surveillance included proponents of racial
and gender equality and advocates of non-violence, most notably, the

opinion in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971), in which the Court had said that a
general claim by activists that they could be targeted by government surveillance and,
therefore, that their exercise of their First Amendment rights was chilled was too
speculative to confer standing. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit said, the plaintiffs in
Presbyterian Church claimed that congregants hesitated to come and worship, thus
impacting the ability of the church to carry out its ministries. Presbyterian Church, 870
F.2d at 522.
See also Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1518 (9th Cir.
1986) (distinguishing Lairdbecause plaintiffs, unlike those in Laird,were actual targets of
surveillance).
144. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505, 1516 (D. Ariz.
1990). Of course, this "invitation" is a fiction, premised on the informants' deception of the
targets of the investigation; had the informants told the targets that they were not fellow
believers or members of the public but government agents, no "invitation" would have
been forthcoming.
145. See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations:
The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 446 (1990) ("[P]olice rulemaking regarding their
fourth amendment activities is a highly desirable undertaking.").
146. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACrIVITIES, 94TH CONG., INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS 5 (Comm. Print 1976).
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Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King. 147 Besides spying on political figures,
the federal government also investigated and conducted surveillance on
religious groups, including church youth groups and priests' conferences.148
But, among all of the government's illegal spying tactics, "[t]he most
pervasive surveillance technique [was] the informant. In a random sample
of domestic intelligence cases, 83% involved informants [while only] 5%
involved electronic surveillance." 149 Informants were often used against
"peaceful, law-abiding groups," the investigation found, and informants
sometimes engaged in violent activity as members of the targeted
groups.so
These abuses led the Attorney General, Edward Levi, to establish
internal guidelines for the use of informants by the FBI. Beginning with
the first version of these guidelines, which became known as the Levi
Guidelines,"' the FBI restrained its investigations into political and
religious groups by requiring that, to recruit or place informants in such
groups, the FBI needed "specific and articulable facts giving reason to
believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities
which involve the use of force or violence."152 In addition, the guidelines
required permission from FBI headquarters for any and all full
investigations.' The bottom line was that the FBI, either through its own
sworn agents or through informants, could not infiltrate religious groups
without some factual basis to suspect that the persons concerned had taken
part, or were about to take part, in a crime.154
During succeeding decades, the Department of Justice modified the
guidelines several times in reaction to scandals concerning the use of
informants,15 5 without changing the overall structure and operations of the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 13.
Id.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (1976), repnted in FBI Oversight:

HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,95th Cong. 50-53 (1977).
152. Id. at 51.
153. Id.
154. By the end of the 1970s, police departments in a number of states and cities
followed the example of the Levi Guidelines, either because of state laws, municipal
ordinances, or court decrees in lawsuits. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text
concerning the Handschuand Alliance to EndRepressioncases and related matters.
155. In the Abscam sting operation of the late 1970s, a con man working as an
informant for the FBI acted as a front man for an FBI corruption probe that eventually
ensnared a senator, six members of the House of Representatives, and a number of state
and local politicians on corruption charges. See United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206,
1209-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (describing the Abscam "sting" operation and the related cash
payoffs of elected officials), affd, 692 F.2d 823, 861 (2d Cir. 1982). Following the Abscam
scandal, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued new guidelines. OFFICE OF THE
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guidelines. In 2002, however, Attorney General John Ashcroft made
major changes to the guidelines. Citing the attacks of September 11, 2001,
as a justification,156 Ashcroft issued general guidelines on crimes,
racketeering, and terrorism investigations that allowed the use of
informants and other types of monitoring in religious and other settings
without any predicate of suspicious conduct."' From May of 2002 forward,
therefore, the FBI no longer needed a basis in fact in order to place
ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI USE
OF INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (1980), reprintedin S. REP. No. 97-682, at
504-16 (1980). See also Irvin B. Nathan, Abscam: A Fair and Effective Method for
FightingPublic Corruption, ih ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 2, 14-15 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., 1983) (describing the Civiletti Guidelines,
which established "elaborate review procedures with the Department of Justice and
mandate[d] certain criteria designed to minimize any possibility of entrapment or other
unfairness to potential defendants"). There were allegations that the informant had used
his government-created front business to commit unrelated frauds. See, e.g., Howard
Kurtz, The Sting and the Innocent Bystander,S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1985, at 17 ("In Abscam,
a convicted swindler used the FBI's cover in the successful bribery probe ... to run his own
investment scam, defrauding dozens of at least $150,000."). The pattern of revision
following scandal was repeated in the late 1990s, when investigators exposed a far-reaching
scandal in Boston involving the FBI and organized crime informants who were protected
and allowed to commit many violent crimes. For a lively telling of the details of this
scandal, see generally DICK LEHR & GERARD O'NEILL, BLACK MASS: THE TRUE STORY OF
AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE FBI AND THE IRISH MOB (2001). The ensuing
racketeering and extortion case was first litigated in United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp.
2d 141 (D. Mass. 1999), rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st
Cir. 2000). In response to the scandal, Attorney General Janet Reno issued new guidelines.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS (2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ciguidelines.htm. The Reno Guidelines superseded
both the Levi Guidelines and the Civiletti Guidelines. Id. at § I(A)(3).
156. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks on the Attorney General
Guidelines (May 30, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/53002ag
preparedremarks.htm.
157. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE, AND
TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS § VI(A)(2) (2002) ("For the purpose of detecting or
preventing terrorist activities, the FBI is authorized to visit any place and attend any event
that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public
generally."), available at http://www.fpdct.org/reference/crimes-racketeringterrorism.pdf.
As the language regarding any event that is "open to the public" indicates, the Domestic
Security Guidelines were not targeted only at Muslim religious institutions, or even only at
religious institutions generally; rather, they allowed this type of spying anywhere the public
might be. See id. But to say that these regulations simply allow the government's police
spies to do what the public does surely misses the crucial difference between the presence
of a member of the public and an investigation by a government agent. See Laurence H.
Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie
v. Robbins, 2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 69 n.183 (discussing the Supreme Court's
statement that there was no real difference between the government and a private party as
property owner and stating that "[t]he [Court's] analogy shockingly ignores the
Constitution's central premise that the government, being uniquely powerful, is uniquely in
need of restraints that would be wholly out of place in our fundamental law's treatment of
private parties").
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informants in a mosque or a church. Rather, these investigations could be
undertaken without any prior reason to suspect any illegal conduct by
congregants. In 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey reaffirmed the
Ashcroft position with the new Attorney General's Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations."' As a result, the use of internal regulation
regarding informants, utilized by the FBI itself in years past, no longer
presents a viable method for regulating most informant behavior in
mosques or any other religious setting.
Thus we are left with one overarching impression of the law that
governs the use of informants. The Fourth Amendment affords law
enforcement nearly full discretion to decide when and how to use
informants." 9 Defenses like entrapment remain available at trial, but
these defenses seem more theoretical than real in terms of what they might
do to reign in informant activity. While individuals can bring civil suits,
relief seems unlikely. Finally, the FBI has largely abandoned internal
regulation as a way to regulate discretion over when and why agents can
place informants in First Amendment-sensitive places like religious
institutions.
III.
BENEFITS, BUT ALSO COSTS

Given what we know now concerning the terrorist threat we face and
the almost unlimited discretion that police have on this issue, it seems
certain that the FBI and local police agencies will continue to place
informants into Muslim communities to gather intelligence. To some
degree, this is not just unavoidable, but also necessary. But it is too
simplistic to view this as an unalloyed good-that is, to pretend that one
can pursue the benefits of this strategy without incurring costs. We may
decide that the benefits we receive outweigh the costs, but we cannot
simply assume the truth of this proposition, or, -worse yet, pretend that no
costs exist. On the contrary, we must acknowledge both costs and benefits,
and then attempt to work out the right accommodation between them.
Any perspective that includes only the benefits risks an incomplete and
158. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
159. It is worth noting, though, that state law could potentially play an important role
in this context. While some state law limiting the use of informants exists, see infra note
218 and accompanying text, new laws along these lines seem unlikely to pass now, given
current public attitudes regarding terrorism. There has, however, been at least some
interest in legislative reform of the use of informants. See, e.g., Law Enforcement
ConfidentialInformantPractices:Joint OversightHearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism and HomelandSecurity and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and
CivilLiberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,110th Cong. 66-74 (2007) (statement of
Alexandra Natapoff, Professor, Loyola Law School) (urging the collection of data on the
use of informants at all levels).
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therefore incorrect calculus on the question of whether to use this tactic.
A.

The Benefit: UsingInformants to Address a Risk That We Cannot
DiscountEntirely

Given the fact that no terrorist attacks have occurred in the United
States since September 11, 2001, and that the plots allegedly foiled since
then seem much smaller in scale than the 9/11 attacks, one might conclude
that no terrorist presence exists on U.S. soil. In fact, at least one
authoritative source has seemed to imply just that.'" Yet even if there is
no terrorist presence today, that does not mean that members of new cells
could not enter the United States now or in the future. Moreover, we must
also ask whether "homegrown terrorists"-people from inside our country,
either citizens or long-time residents-might turn to terrorism, as FBI
Director Robert Mueller fears.' Homegrown terrorism has become a real
problem in Western Europe, as demonstrated by the attacks on public
transit in London in July of 2005162 and the assassination of the filmmaker
and commentator Theo van Gogh in the Netherlandsl 6 3-both by
extremists native to those countries.
Next to the scope of this problem as it presents itself in Western
Europe, the United States seems to face far less danger.'" Nevertheless,
we cannot completely discount the possibility of either sleeper cells
introduced into our country or homegrown terrorism on our soil. Nor can
we say that infiltration by informants could not serve as an effective, even
decisive, weapon against such groups. Approximating the risk of another
terrorist attack in the United States seems difficult, but, if estimating this
risk is not easy, saying no risk exists is impossible, and probably foolhardy.
Moreover, we need only look to recent events in this country to see that
this is true. For example, the three terror suspects charged in Toledo,
Ohio, seemed not to have formed any plan to launch an attack in the
160. In the aftermath of the exhaustive investigation by the independent September 11
Commission, Thomas Kean, Co-chairman of the Commission and former Governor of New
Jersey, said flatly that there were no sleeper cells in the United States assisting the 9/11
hijackers and that the attackers had come from overseas. Frontline: The Enemy Within
(PBS television broadcast Mar. 27, 2006) (statement of Thomas Kean) ("[P]eople talked
about cells and sleeper cells and all of that; we didn't find any."), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/interviews/kean.html.
161. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
162. See Khevyn Limbajee, BBC News, Politics Show, London: Behind the Face of
Terror (July 15, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/politicsshow/4681763.stm
(reporting that three of the four London bombers were British nationals of Pakistani
descent).
163. See generallyIAN BURUMA, MURDER INAMSTERDAM: THE DEATH OF THEO VAN
GOGH AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE 35 (2006) (describing the murder of van Gogh by a
radical Dutch Muslim).
164. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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United States, but federal prosecutors allege that at least one actually
traveled to Jordan in a failed attempt to deliver tactical assistance to the
anti-American insurgents killing American soldiers in Iraq."
In the spring of 2007, authorities made arrests in two terrorism cases in
the New York region, both of which raised the specter of so-called
homegrown terrorism. First, in May 2007, six foreign-born men were
arrested and charged with plotting an attack on Fort Dix, in New Jersey.
Of the six, all lived in the United States-some for more than two
decades -highlighting law enforcement's fears about the "homegrown"
nature of the danger.'66 Then, in June 2007, four men, including one
naturalized American citizen, were arrested and charged with plotting to
attack Kennedy Airport in New York City by bombing the jet fuel lines
that supply the airport.16 7 According to the government's allegations, the
leader of the plot was a naturalized American citizen, who hatched the
plans, conducted surveillance, and went to Trinidad to seek financing and
support from a violent Muslim group.168 In at least these three cases-the
165. Indictment at 1, United States v. Amawi, No. 3:06CRO719 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 16,
2006) ("1.... AMAWI traveled to Jordan in October 2003, and returned to the United
States in March 2004. While in Jordan, AMAWI unsuccessfully attempted to enter Iraq to
wage violent jihad, or 'holy war,' against the United States and coalition forces.") (on file
with author). Note that, at the time of this writing, these remain unproven allegations; no
trial has taken place, and no admissions have occurred as part of any plea agreement.
166. See Christine Hauser & Anahad O'Connor, 6 Arrested in Plot to Attack Fort
Dix, NYTIMES.COM, May 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/us/08cnd-dix.html
(stating the criminal complaint alleged that the suspects aimed to kill at least a hundred
soldiers with rocket propelled grenades); Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terroistsin
the File Cabinet?, NEWSWEEK, May 16, 2007, http://www.newsweek.com/id/39408
(reporting that three Albanian brothers involved in the plot are believed to have entered
the United States illegally in 1984 and remained here for two decades afterwards); Dale
Russakoff & Dan Eggen, Six Chargedin Plot to Attack Fort Dix, WASH. POST, May 9,
2007, at Al (stating that the FBI and the Department of Justice portrayed the defendants
"as a leaderless, homegrown cell of immigrants" with "no apparent connection to al-Qaeda
or other international terrorist organizations," but who appeared "to be an example of the
kind of self-directed sympathizers widely predicted-and feared-by counterterrorism
specialists"); FBI Pins Fort Dix Plot on Homegrown' Terrorists(National Public Radio
broadcast May 9, 2007) (reporting that the suspects had been in the United States for years
and that they "are thought to have created the jihad mission themselves, without outside
support" from Al-Qaeda or other international terrorist groups, and quoting an FBI agent
as stating that "[t]hese homegrown terrorists can prove to be as dangerous as any known
group, if not more so"), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=10089947; Six Accused of Plot to Attack Fort Dix (National Public Radio
broadcast May 8, 2007) (reporting that all the suspects lived in the United States and that
one was a citizen, two were legal residents, and three had been in the United States
illegally), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyld=10080637. In
December 2008, a jury convicted all of the defendants of conspiracy to kill soldiers but
acquitted them of attempted murder. Paul von Zielbauer & Jon Hurdle, 5 Men Are
Convictedin Plot on FortDix, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, at A23.
167. Cara Buckley & William K. Rashbaum, 4 Men Accused of Plot to Blow Up
Kennedy Airport Terminals andFuelLines,N.Y. TIMES, June 3,2007, at A37.
168. See id. The plot was almost immediately viewed as "homegrown." See, e.g.,
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Toledo case, the Fort Dix plot, and the targeting of Kennedy Airport-the
authorities used informants to gather crucial facts.'69 In the Fort Dix and
Kennedy Airport plots, one can certainly conclude that, had the plots
matured, they could have presented some real danger, even if not as much
as the terrorists would have liked.170
All of this shows that the potential danger of homegrown terrorist
plots, though perhaps not great, remains real; in any event, we cannot
dismiss it. Since law enforcement has sometimes used informants to nip
these nascent dangers in the bud, we should not expect police to abandon
this tactic now.
B. The Costs: CripplingPolice/CommunityCooperation,the Possibility
of Abuse, and the Dangerof Police Activity in the Areas Crucialto First
Amendment Values
1.

The Damage to RelationsBetween Law Enforcement andMuslim
Communities

The most important cost of using informants within mosques and
other religious institutions remains the damage this tactic may do to law
enforcement's ability to receive crucial intelligence and information from
the Muslim community. As discussed, law enforcement and intelligence
officials agree on the importance of finding common ground between
Building relationships that can
police and Muslim communities.1'
engender trust with Muslim communities must become a top priority for
law enforcement, because police need trusted partners in the Muslim
communities if they want intelligence on the activities of anyone in those
Anthony Faiola & Steven Mufson, N. Y Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say, WASH. POST,
June 3, 2007, at Al (stating that the charges "provided yet more evidence of the threat
posed by homegrown terrorists, embittered extremists who hail from the Middle East or, in
this case, from the Caribbean and northeastern South America"); Greg Miller & Erika
Hayasaki, Arrests Made in Alleged JFK Plot, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at Al
(characterizing the case as "the latest in a series of alleged domestic terrorist threats
involving Muslims residing legally in the U.S.").
169. See Miller & Hayasaki, supra note 168 ("Much of the federal case cites
information obtained with the help of an FBI informant . . . "); Zielbauer & Hurdle, supra
note 166 ("Prosecution evidence included hundreds of secretly taped conversations
.between the defendants and F.B.I. informants . .").
170. While the desired attack on Kennedy Airport's fuel lines or airport fuel tanks
would probably not have resulted in the destruction of the airport, or even of the entire fuel
system, and would most likely have caused relatively limited (or no) loss of life, it would
have disrupted the U.S. aviation system for at least a short time and perhaps crippled a
major U.S. air travel hub for a long period. See Buckley & Rashbaum, supra note 167
(quoting experts as saying that system of safety valves would have limited the damage);
Faiola & Mufson, supra note 168 (pointing out that successful completion of the plot might
have "resulted in . . . relatively limited loss of life" but quoting a former head of the
Transportation Security Administration as saying that it "'could cripple the airlines').
171. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
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Members of Muslim
communities who might seem suspicious.
communities know the facts on the ground where they live; this makes
them the best source of information on suspicious activity. When police
and Muslim community members have strong, positive relationships,
information concerning suspicious activity can make its way to the police;
if police do not have alliances with the people who live in these
communities, this diminishes their chances of gaining knowledge of what
goes on there.
The foundation for any relationship that will foster communication
and, therefore, the sharing of intelligence, is trust, and the use of
informants in a community can damage or destroy that trust all too
easily.172 Without that kind of partnership, there exists little chance that
real relationships can flourish, and this, in turn, reduces the chances that
community members will share the information they have with law
enforcement-whether out of fear of or discomfort with police, out of a
feeling that they suffer unfair mistreatment like ethnic profiling, or simply
because they feel that law enforcement does not have their interests at
heart.17 1
Opportunities for intelligence and information gathering are not the
only potential benefits of creating relationships with Muslim communities.
Another potential benefit is better trained and more sensitive law
For example, former Chicago Police
enforcement officials.
Superintendent Terrance Hillard, who had worked hard to create strong
relationships with many minority communities, including Muslims, enlisted
members of the Chicago Muslim community to help design training for
police officers concerning how they could deal more sensitively and
successfully with Muslim airport patrons. 174 The results, including a
training video co-written by the police department and a group of
Muslims, were applauded by both the Muslim community and the police
themselves.17 s
The point is that there is much to gain for everyone in this debatenot just intelligence and information for the police, but also a way to
cooperate on many issues of concern to both police and these
communities. It is an opportunity that neither the police nor the Muslim
172. The experience of Muslims in New York City provides a particularly telling
example of these feelings of betrayal. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text
(discussing how, when Muslims who had worked with the FBI and their local police
departments learned of the informants in their communities, they felt not just surprise, but
betrayal).
173. See, e.g., Carolyn Marshall, 24- Year Term for Californian in Terrorism Training
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at A20 (Quoting the executive director of a Muslim
organization as saying that Hamid Hayat's sentencing "'sent a clear message to the Muslim
community. You do not speak to an F.B.I. agent unless you have an attorney present."').
174. HARRIS, supranote 38, at 47-52.
175. Id.at 51-52.
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community should undervalue, and an opportunity that might be lost if law
enforcement inserts informants into communities.
2. Abuse in the Use of Informants
Another potential cost of using informants in mosques may come from
abuse by law enforcement. Almost any investigative tactic carries with it
the potential for abuse. The use of informants, particularly (though not
only) in sensitive contexts like religious or political organizations, has
proven a perennial source of abuse over many years. Congressional
investigations in the 1970s exposed some of these abuses, bringing to light
ways in which our own government spied upon Americans whose conduct
fell within the zone of First Amendment protection.176 On account of these
abuses, the FBI and the Department of Justice have issued guidelines over
the past three decades, beginning with the Levi Guidelines in the 1970s, to
address these issues. 177 While the Levi Guidelines allowed the government
to spy domestically on First Amendment activities only if there was reason
to suspect a crime,"' under the current guidelines, federal law enforcement
now enjoys much wider discretion to spy and use informants. 179
One might have hoped that the guidelines, whatever drawbacks they
might have, would at least have changed the FBI's prior patterns of failing
to abide by the Constitution. However, evidence shows that many agents
have not been following the FBI's own internal rules. For example, a 2005
report by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice indicated
that the FBI continues to fail to follow its guidelines for using
informants."so In a comprehensive analysis of compliance with all of the
FBI's Investigative Guidelines, the Inspector General found, "The most
significant problems were failures to comply with the Confidential
[W]e identified one or more Guidelines
Informant Guidelines.. ..
violationsin87percent of the confidentialinformantfiles we examined"18
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See, e.g., supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20, 144-47 and accompanying text.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE
GUIDELINES 2 (2005), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0509/final.pdf.

181. Id. (emphasis added). It is also worth noting that the FBI does not stand alone in
having violated guidelines on the use of surveillance and informants. Recall that the NYPD
violated the Handschu guidelines even after a federal court relaxed them considerably by
videotaping law-abiding people at demonstrations and spying extensively on political and
social-cause groups. Handschu v. Special Services Division, 475 F. Supp. 2d 331, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The evidence on this motion indicates that police officers engaged in
videotaping and photography which violated the Modified Handschu Guidelines."); Dwyer,
supra note 129 (reporting that Judge Haight found that "by videotaping people who were
exercising their right to free speech and breaking no laws, the Police Department had
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This finding is particularly sobering given that the FBI adopted the
Guidelines for the express purpose of forcing its own agents to do a better
job handling informants and avoiding the many pitfalls and ethical
dilemmas that prior scandals illuminated.
Two possible explanations for the FBI's failure to regulate itself with
successive sets of guidelines stand out. First, the FBI and the Department
of Justice have always said explicitly that the various guidelines create no
enforceable rights.'82 That is, the FBI's failure to follow the guidelines
does not give any person any legal right to sue over what the FBI did and
thus carries no penalty either against the FBI or the individual agent in a
lawsuit brought by the victim. This effectively makes the guidelines
unenforceable from outside the FBI.
Second, and just as important, the guidelines focus on how to use
they do not consider under what circumstances the
informants;'
government should use informants-i.e., with how much justifying
evidence, and for what purpose, the government should deploy informants.
This omission is especially grave because it is the very issue the Supreme
Court's cases on the subject failed to address, since (according to the Hoffa
and White cases) everyone "assumes the risk" that anyone could be a
government informant.'" Without any rules concerning the circumstances
ignored the milder limits he had imposed on it in 2003").
182. E.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T

OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS § I.H (2002)

("Nothing in these Guidelines is intended to create or does create an enforceable legal right
or private right of action by a [confidential informant] or any other person.").
183. See, e.g., id. § I.C ("A [Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency] agent
does not have any authority to make any promise or commitment that would prevent the
government from prosecuting an individual for criminal activity that is not authorized. .. or
that would limit the use of any evidence by the government, without the prior written
approval of the [Federal Prosecuting Office] that has primary jurisdiction to prosecute the
[confidential informant] for such criminal activity. [An agent] must take the utmost care to
avoid giving any person the erroneous impression that he or she has any such authority.");
id. § II.A.1 ("Prior to utilizing a person as a [confidential informant], a case agent of a
[Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency] shall complete and sign a written Initial
Suitability Report and Recommendation, which shall be forwarded to a Field Manager for
his or her written approval."); id. § II.D.2 ("Prior to utilizing an individual as a High Level
Confidential Informant, a case agent of a [Department of Justice Law Enforcement
Agency] shall first obtain the written approval of the [Confidential Informant Review
Committee]. A Criminal Division representative on the [Confidential Informant Review
Committee] who disagrees with a decision to approve the use of an individual as a High
Level Confidential Informant may seek review of that decision pursuant to paragraph
(I)(G)."); id.§ III.A.2.a ("A [Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency] agent shall
not: (i) exchange gifts with a [confidential informant]; (ii) provide the [confidential
informant] with any thing of more than nominal value; (iii) receive any thing of more than
nominal value from a [confidential informant]; or (iv) engage in any business or financial
transactions with a [confidential informant]."). Amidst all this necessary but bureaucratic
regulation, one searches the guidelines in vain for anything resembling guidance on what
types of cases might be appropriate for use of confidential informants.
184. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
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under which the law should allow law enforcement to use informants, the
FBI retains full flexibility without supervision or accountability. Without
any standards that the FBI must follow in order to avoid real consequences
imposed from the outside, nothing will change and abuses will continue.
We would be naive to hope for anything different.
3. The Damage to Religiousand AssociationalValues CausedBy
InformantActivity in FirstAmendment-ProtectedSettings

The use of informants in sensitive settings, such as political meetings
or religious services, calls for special care. This may seem obvious, but the
findings of investigation after investigation, from the congressional
hearings in the 1970s onward,"' show a remarkably consistent disregard
for the damage done by surveillance in these contexts.
Surely, when people suspect their presence, the use of informants can
chill the exercise of free speech and the expression of political opinions,
particularly unpopular ones. And this seems to be exactly what has
happened among many Muslims in the United States because Muslims are
fully aware that police and government agencies have infiltrated their
When any community knows that informants or
communities.18 6
undercover police officers have infiltrated it, political discourse (and
speech on any topic that may seem even vaguely political) can easily
become the first casualty because people begin to understand that they
must take care in what they say and to whom they say it. For example, in
the wake of the revelations that the NYPD used informants to infiltrate
mosques in the Herald Square Case, a Muslim high school senior said that
"when you sit down and politics comes to your head, you think, 'Who's
around?"'187 Another man, an assistant teacher at a public high school,
said, "It's like a police state here."1" A Palestinian immigrant said that,
because of the presence of informants, "[s]ometimes you look a person in
the eye, there's a feeling. You can say anything you want, but don't curse
the system. That's what they care about."189 This kind of self-censorshipnot of speech aimed at advocating or planning criminal or terrorist acts but
rather of simple discussion of political issues-is directly at odds with the
constitutional protection of, and American preference for, robust and open
debate on social and political questions.

185. See supranotes 146-58 and accompanying text.
186. For example, in the wake of revelations that the NYPD used informants to
infiltrate mosques and other religious institutions in the Herald Square case, a Muslim
community activist stated that the police "think we don't know, but we know who they
are." Elliott, supra note 16.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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Among First Amendment-protected venues, most people would
certainly think of religious institutions-churches, synagogues, temples,
and mosques-as the most sensitive of settings because these institutions
provide us with a place to feel open and secure with our beliefs, traditions,
and fellow believers."'o The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause
allows us to freely and openly participate in religious life. Many legal
scholars agree that infiltration of religious institutions may indeed have a
chilling effect on the exercise of these important rights,"' and even some
former federal law enforcement officials have joined this consensus.
Any government actions that potentially intrude on such a place, or on
religious activities, should only take place when absolutely necessary, and
the government should carry them out as carefully and as narrowly as
possible, consistent with a keen awareness of the damage that such an
intrusion may cause.
The recent upsurge in surveillance by informants in mosques has
brought to light examples of the sort of damage that intrusion into houses
of prayer can do, much of it lasting. For example, after a series of
terrorism-related arrests in the Portland, Oregon, area, Salma Ahmad of
the Bilal Mosque in suburban Beaverton, Oregon, remembers that she and
her fellow congregants became aware that the government had planted an
informant in their mosque, resulting in some of the arrests.1 93 News of the
informant's infiltration quickly caused bonds to break down between
190. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 22, at 1236 ("[A] religious service is uniquely
sensitive. Worshippers seek refuge in their religious institutions. They seek a setting that is
conducive to introspection and spiritual growth. . .. Government intrusion in a religious
institution compromises the sense of security that is a necessary condition for the practice
of religion.").
191. See Mike Bothwell, FacingGod or the Government-United States v. Aguilar: A
Big Step for Big Brother, 1990 BYU L. REV. 1003, 1009 ("People generally refrain from
open expression of religious views under the eye of the government."); Elliff, supra note 22,
at 786-87 ("The absence of specific guidelines to control governmental overreaching may
lead courts to find that domestic security investigations unduly chill the exercise of
constitutional rights."); Rubin, supra note 22, at 456 (concluding that government
intelligence gathering on religious or political groups "may 'chill' the exercise of a first
amendment right to express views in a public forum by individuals or organizations").
192. See, e.g., Anti-terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After
September 11, 2001: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H Comm.

on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 37 (2003) (statement of Paul Rosenzweig, former Staff
Attorney, Department of Justice) ("There should . .. be a hesitancy in visiting public places
and events that are clearly intended to involve the exercise of core First Amendment rights,
as the presence of official observers may chill expression."), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/rosenzweig052003.htm; Adam Liptak, Traces of Terror: News
Analysis; Changing the Standard,N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002, at Al (quoting a former U.S.
Attorney as saying that, without appropriate guidelines, law enforcement could "conduct
investigations that had a chilling effect on entirely appropriate lawful expressions of
political beliefs, the free exercise of religion and the freedom of assembly").
193. Telephone Interview with Salma Ahmad (Mar. 15, 2007) (transcript on file with
the author).
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congregants, because news of the presence of the informant, himself a
Muslim, "brought mistrust among the brothers in the mosque."' 9 4 This
mistrust led people to act in ways contrary to Muslim custom and practice
almost immediately. Ms. Ahmad cited two examples to illustrate this
point. First, when the news of the informant's presence emerged, the
Bilal's traditional congregational bonding "was cut, because you don't
know who is going to inform what."l 95 Second, Ms. Ahmad relayed how
news that informants had been among the people at Bilal directly
undermined an important Muslim custom of greeting.19 6 Ms. Ahmad feels
that this lack of trust in a Muslim community, especially in a mosque, cuts
directly against the core of Islam because "in Islam we think you should
trust your brother and that [lack of trust] gives them that feeling of
alienation.""
In March 2004, sometime after the revelation of the presence of
informants at Bilal Mosque, federal authorities mistakenly arrested
Brandon Mayfield, a local attorney who regularly attended worship
services at Bilal, for involvement with the train bombings in Madrid.198
Mayfield's arrest and several weeks of incarceration without bail (for
which the FBI later apologizedl 99 and settled Mayfield's subsequent lawsuit
for two million dollars in damages) 2m became the occasion for the earlier
informant-related trauma at Bilal to resurface. Normally, the Bilal
community would have rushed to the defense of a fellow worshiper who
had been arrested and detained, but knowledge of the use of an informant
194. Id. at 2-3.
195. Id. at 1.

196. Id. at 3 ("Because when you are in congregations you are suppose [sic] to be one,
you love your brother, you hug each other.... [But nowj nobody will welcome the new
people ... [because of] the situation and the utmost fear, is gone, that love ... that trust is
gone."). The Muslim command to welcome strangers, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, is
one of the highest obligations in Islam-one that applies especially to welcoming strangers
to one's mosque. A visitor to a mosque at prayer time must receive a warm and respectful
welcome because "the Prophet tells us that when there is a new brother welcome [him], you
hug, you kiss." Id.at 3.
197. Id.
198. Dan Eggen, U.S. Settles Suit Filed by Ore. Lawyer; $2 Million Will Be Paidfor
Wrongful ArrestAfter MadridAttack, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2006, at A3 (explaining how

the FBI bungled a fingerprint match and mistakenly linked Mayfield to a terrorist attack);
Les Zaitz, Noelle Crombie, Joseph Rose & Mark Larabee, FingerprintLinks Oregon with
Spain, OREGONIAN, May 8, 2004, at Al (detailing the government's argument that Mayfield
was involved in the Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004, and reporting his arrest on a
material witness warrant). See also Telephone Interview with Salma Ahmad, supra note
193, at 4-6 (discussing how Mayfield was a member of the Bilal Mosque).
199. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement on Brandon Mayfield
Case (May 24,2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrelO4/mayfield052404.htm
(describing errors in fingerprint analysis implicating Mayfield and apologizing for "the
hardships that this matter has caused").
200. E.g., Eggen, supra note 198 (discussing the FBI settlement for two million dollars
of a lawsuit brought by Mayfield and the FBI's apology).
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during the earlier investigation affected the community's usually
supportive spirit. "When Brandon was arrested they [sic] was a hesitation
of the members of the community to even call the family, or go to
Brandon's house to see them," Ms. Ahmad recalled.20 1 People said, "'[O]h
my God [the FBI] would see my car, they would see my license [plates]
that I went to Brandon's."' Even though they were innocent, Ms. Ahmad
and other members of her community feared becoming the subject of
government scrutiny and perhaps arrest themselves.2 0
The experiences of Muslims nationwide mirror those of Ms. Ahmad
and her fellow worshippers at the Bilal Mosque. Across the country,
leaders of mosques have noticed reduced attendance at services.203 People
at mosques have become cautious and wary in expressing themselves to
each other. 20 Trust in fellow congregants has subtly but noticeably worn
away and been replaced by suspicion.20 s In short, Muslims have begun to
fear that merely being present at their houses of worship, or conspicuously
expressing their faith and traditions, could bring the full weight of a
government investigation down on them.

IV.
FIXING THE PROBLEM: RECOGNIZING MUTUALLY REINFORCING NEEDS

On the one hand, law enforcement wants and badly needs the type of
relationships with Muslim communities that would result in mutual
cooperation and frequent communication, so as to ensure the maximum
possible flow of intelligence on potential terrorist threats from within the
201. Telephone Interview with Salma Ahmad, supra note 193, at 4.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Lynn Duke, Worship and Worry; At a Brooklyn Mosque, Muslims Pray
in the Shadow of Terrorism, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2003, at C1 (noting that attendance at a
Brooklyn mosque has dropped, financial support has dried up, and worshippers live under
suspicion because of investigations by police agents); Teresa Watanabe, QuakersPromote
ImmigrantRights Citing an Increase in Abuses Since the Sept. 11 Attacks, the Group Is
Asking Those Who Have Been Victimized to Step Forward,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at
B6 (noting that law-abiding worshippers in Philadelphia have stayed home for holiday and
daily prayer rituals rather than attend services at a mosque that might be under
surveillance); Mosque Attendance Falls After Terrorism Arrests (National Public Radio
broadcast May 30, 2007) (describing how attendance at a New Jersey mosque has
plummeted as a result of law enforcement activities), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=10529148.
204. See, e.g., Warren Richey & Linda Feldman, Has Post-9/11 Dragnet Gone Too
Far?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 12, 2003, at 1 (quoting one community leader as
saying that "'[s]ome people are afraid to cite verses of the Koran that include the word
"jihad" when leading prayers, because they think the government is listening"').
205. See e.g., Liptak, supra note 192 (quoting a member of the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations as saying that "[it starts to erode some of the trust and good will that
exists in [mosques and other religious settings] if you're afraid they have been infiltrated by
an undercover agent").

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

2010] LA WENFORCEMENTAND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 169

Muslim community. The Muslim community has responded, for the most
part, with willing (if at times understandably wary) cooperation. On the
other hand, law enforcement has begun to use informants in mosques and
other sensitive settings, and the Muslim community's reaction of betrayal
threatens to swamp any efforts to create the important positive
connections that law enforcement wants and needs. In other words, using
informants can produce useful information, but it also produces significant
costs in terms of public safety. Faced with such a dilemma, how can we
ensure that law enforcement get the benefits of using informants when
necessary, while minimizing the costs?
A. Bringingthe Use of Informants Under the WarrantClause and
Getting Rid of the Hoffa andWhite "Assumption of the Risk" Standard

One solution would begin with the reconsideration of the Supreme
Court's decisions in the Hoffa and White cases, in which the Court
declared the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the government's
placement and use of informants, thereby giving police unfettered
discretion to use informants without having to submit the reasons for their
suspicion to independent examination by a court.2 06 Ordinarily, obtaining
a warrant by meeting the probable cause standard constitutes the sine qua
non of general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but the Court's holdings
in these cases virtually eliminated the warrant requirement in the
informant context. Because unfettered police discretion almost inevitably
leads to abuse at some point,207 and because of the sensitivity of placing
government spies in homes, political gatherings, or religious institutions, it
seems especially wise to have a judge decide whether the available
evidence gives the government probable cause to support an intrusion.
Professor Tracey Maclin has made the case for subjecting the use of
informants to traditional constitutional restraints, consistent with his belief
that "the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police
power."208 Maclin argues:
[T]he government's authority to use informants and secret agents
can and should be controlled by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Police operations involving the planting of
Amendment.
informants in a home or the recording of private conversation
206. See supra Section II.A.
207. This has certainly proven true in the context of the use of informants. See supra
notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
208. Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment: A Reconsideration,74
WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 578 (1996). The complete discretion of police, local or federal, to use
informants however and whenever they wish and to pick the targets of this kind of
surveillance as they like, Maclin says, "is at odds with the values that inspired the Fourth
Amendment." Id.

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

170

N Y U REVIEW OFLA W& SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 34:123

should be subject to the same [rules] that currently control
governmental wiretapping and bugging.2 09
The type of judicial supervision that Maclin recommends would not form
any significant barrier to the legitimate use of informants because the
Supreme Court has stressed that lower courts should understand and apply
the probable cause standard in a non-technical, non-legalistic way, through
the lens of police officers making common-sense judgments. 210 As a result,
requiring a warrant and probable cause would simply recognize that these
intrusions have a cost and that they should occur only with a reason.
Moreover, returning to the warrant and probable cause requirements
would have the salutary effect of implicitly forcing an overdue
reexamination of the "assumption of the risk" doctrine the Court adopted
in Hoffa and White. The idea that we should base the scope of
constitutional protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment on a
common law tort concept seems antiquated. Moreover, the Supreme
Court rejected similar reliance on property concepts in United States v.
Katz, the case that established the "reasonable expectations of privacy"
test as the fountainhead of much of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
more than forty years ago.21'
More important, the Supreme Court's use of the "assumption of the
risk" idea represents a poor doctrinal choice. Recall that the Hoffa Court
endorsed the part of Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez in which he spoke
of the inherent risk of betrayal in all communication.2 12 However, Justice
Brennan had also noted that the risks inherent in the use of electronic
listening and recording systems threaten to take the danger of betrayal to
new heights.2 13 By using only the first half of Justice Brennan's thought209. Id.
210. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1980) ("[Tlhe evidence thus collected
must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement.").
211. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (rejecting common law
property concepts as the basis for measuring scope of Fourth Amendment because "'[tihe
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has
been discredited' (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967))).
212. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) ("'The risk of being overheard by
an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with
whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of
risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak."' (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 465 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
213. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("But the risk [of electronic
surveillance] .. . is of a different order. It is the risk that third parties . . . who cannot be

shut out of a conversation as conventional eavesdroppers can be, merely by a lowering of
voices, or withdrawing to a private place . . . may give independent evidence of any

conversation. There is only one way to guard against such a risk, and that is to keep one's
mouth shut on all occasions."). See also id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]t must be
plain that electronic surveillance imports a peculiarly severe danger to the liberties of the
person.").
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that people with whom we interact can, at any point, betray us-the
majorities in Hoffa and White took his analysis beyond any reasonable
interpretation. As Justice Brennan seemed to imply, risk of betrayal by a
government-induced, government-placed informant is not the same as the
everyday risk that any friend or acquaintance might reveal one's
confidences to another person.
The Court's mistake in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating
to informant use was legally enshrining the "assumption of the risk" idea
without questioning whether the risk that anyone may be working as a
police informant was a risk with which the Court should burden the
country's citizens. Some risk may be an unavoidable fact of everyday life
in any human society, because gossips will always be with us; perhaps we
have only ourselves to blame if we trust them. But when using informants,
the government actively and purposely seeks the opportunity to gain
knowledge of someone's private business for the purpose of prosecuting
her. This may not always be a bad thing, and it may be necessary to catch
certain criminals who may cause great damage if left at large. But the
Court's perfunctory adoption of the "assumption of the risk" analysis
sidestepped any real debate on this question and on the related question of
how best to accommodate the conflicting interests that the use of
informants inevitably presents in some cases. Instead of questioning the
practice, the Court used the "assumption of the risk" language to ratify
existing police practice. In his dissenting opinion in White, Justice Harlan
expressed a desire for a better approach than the "assumption of risk"
theory:
Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules, the customs and values
of the past and present. Since it is the task of the law to form and
project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges,
merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the
desirability of saddling them upon society.214
The use of informants might be brought under the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment, as Professor Maclin recommends, in one of two
ways. First, the Supreme Court could reverse Hoffa and White, at least
insofar as abandoning the "assumption of the risk" principle in favor of
treating the use of informants in the same manner as it treats other
potential Fourth Amendment intrusions. Legislative action presents a
second possibility.215 Congress and state legislatures can step in and
regulate police practices. Even if the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted
214. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
215. The Constitution sets the floor-the minimum acceptable level-of these rights,
but legislatures, including Congress, remain free to provide greater protections. See infra
notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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by the Supreme Court, does not require that law enforcement's desire to
use informants receive any judicial scrutiny or meet any legal standard,
Congress can institute such a requirement by passing a statute. Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,216 which regulates the
use of wiretaps, functions in this way. It is more strict and detailed than
mere Fourth Amendment regulation would be, thereby imposing a tighter
set of restraints on law enforcement than the Fourth Amendment alone
would.
Some state laws also impose greater obligations on law
enforcement use of electronic eavesdropping than either the Fourth
Amendment or the federal Title III statute do. 217 Moreover, several states
have imposed legislative curbs specifically on the use of informants,
mandating that law enforcement in these jurisdictions only infiltrate First
Amendment-sensitive contexts like houses of worship if police have factbased reasons to suspect involvement in criminal activity."

While legislation at either the federal or state level could impose
judicial supervision requirements and legal standards on the use of
informants, the enactment of such legislation seems as unlikely in the
current political climate as a reversal of the Hoffa and White cases by the
Supreme Court. In 2006, Congress reauthorized the expiring provisions of
the Patriot Act 219 with few changes, despite strong opposition. 220 In the fall
216. 18 U.S.C. H§ 2510-2522 (2006).
217. See, e.g., Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, MD. CODE
§§ 10-401 to -414 (2006). In at least one respect the Act provides
broader protection to surveillance targets than Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, for, unlike the federal statute, Maryland requires consent from all parties
to a conversation, not just one, before a conversation may be taped or otherwise
intercepted in the absence of a court order authorizing law enforcement officials to conduct
a wiretap. Miles v. State, 781 A.2d 787, 798 (Md. 2001).
218. For example, in Indiana, "No criminal justice agency shall collect or maintain
information about the political, religious or social views, associations or activities of any
individual . . . unless such information directly relates to an investigation of past or
threatened criminal acts or activities and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the
subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal acts or activities." IND. CODE §
5-2-4-5 (2008). Both Oregon and Pennsylvania have substantially similar statutes. OR. REV.
STAT. § 181.575 (2007) ("No law enforcement agency . . . may collect or maintain
information about the political, religious or social views, associations or activities of any
individual . . . unless such information directly related to an investigation of criminal
activities, and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the subject of the information is or
may be involved in criminal conduct."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9106(b)(2) (West 2000)
("Intelligence information may not be collected or maintained ... concerning participation
in a political, religious or social organization, or in the organization or support of any
nonviolent demonstration . .. unless there is a reasonable suspicion that the participation
by the subject of information is related to criminal activity .... ).
219. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
120 Stat. 192 (2006).
220. Charles Babington, Congress Votes to Renew PatriotAct, with Changes, WASH.
POST, Mar. 8, 2006, at A3 (detailing how the Senate voted for renewal of the Act and noting
both that strong opposition forced some changes in the legislation and that doubts persist
among opponents to the renewal); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, PatriotAct Revisions Pass House,
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
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of 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act,221 which, among
other things, withdrew the possibility of using the writ of habeas corpus in
cases arising from detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.222 In addition, the
summer of 2007 saw the enactment of legislation that provided additional
procedures for the National Security Agency to acquire foreign
intelligence through a warrantless wiretapping program. 223 The state laws
regulating the use of informants, discussed above, were passed many years
ago, 224 and, in more recent years, states have leaned in the other direction,
passing their own "Patriot Acts." 22 In all, statutory restraints on the use of
informants seem unlikely in today's political climate because a political
opponent could easily accuse a legislator advocating such restraints as
being soft on terrorism or handcuffing our police and national security
forces.
Professor Tom Lininger, a scholar who has recognized the complex
and difficult issues presented by the use of informants and other law
enforcement surveillance tactics in mosques, 22 6 agrees that the judicial and
legislative routes to reform seem unpromising.227 He suggests instead the
creation of provisions in state codes of legal ethics that would "prohibit
prosecutors from supervising the surveillance and infiltration of religious
organizations absent a specific suspicion of criminal activity by the

Sending Measure to President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A20 (reporting on how the
House of Representatives passed the renewal and how critics said that the Act's safeguards
did not go far enough); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation to Renew Patnot
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A14 (detailing passage of bill by Senate despite some
opposition).
221. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). This aspect of the Military Commissions Act was
struck down, however, by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
223. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.
224. The state laws mentioned in note 218, supra,were enacted in Indiana in 1977, in
Oregon in 1981, and in Pennsylvania in 1979.
225. See, e.g., S. 9, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). This bill, known
colloquially as "Ohio's Patriot Act," inserted language into state law that, inter alia,
required state officials to cooperate with federal officers enforcing the USA PATRIOT
Act. Ohio S. 9 § 9.63(A) (2005).
226. Lininger, supra note 22.
227. Id. at 1262-66 (arguing, inter alia, that the expertise of the legislative branch is
not ideal for the undertaking). Professor Lininger also discounts the possibility of using law
enforcement's own internal regulations for this purpose. Id. at 1267-68. We do not agree
on this point. I view internal regulation as, generally, a more successful strategy for
regulating police behavior than Professor Lininger does. See generallyHARRIS, supra note
38. Moreover, I view internal regulation as including the kind of local negotiation between
police and citizens that I recommend here, infra Part IV.B. While I would concede some of
the points he makes, for example, the fact that such self-regulation involves a conflict of
interest, Lininger, supra note 22, at 1267, I view this self interest as necessarily including
recognition of the mutually reinforcing interests created by law enforcement's need for
cooperation.
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organization or its members." 2' He argues that because law enforcement
agents increasingly work with and rely upon the advice and consent of
prosecutors when conducting investigations, 229 prosecutorial ethics rules
could serve a gatekeeping function, stopping law enforcement officers
from using intrusive surveillance tactics without a specific suspicion of
criminal activity.2 30
Assuming that such a rule would find wide acceptance in the legal
community of any particular state, 2 3' Lininger's idea is promising. The
possible transitive effect that ethics codes could have on police conduct
make them especially attractive. Ultimately, however, it depends upon the
state bar's enforcement of the ethics rules against prosecutors. In other
words, the question is what happens after the rule is enacted and a
prosecutor declines to follow it, believing in good faith that the rule would
undermine her ability to help police and security officials foil potential
terrorists. This scenario is probably not so unlikely, given the highly
charged nature of anti-terrorism efforts. One wonders whether the bar
Given bar
would have the spine to sanction such a prosecutor.
associations' long history of failing to sanction prosecutors for common
misconduct that is nonetheless blatant, even venal,232 one wonders where
228. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1207.
229. Id. at 1271-72 ("Especially in the federal system, prosecutors play a significant
role in supervising proactive investigations. ... So great is the involvement of prosecutors
in the investigative phase that the Supreme Court has conferred immunity on prosecutors
for their good-faith investigative decisions."). See also Rory K. Little, Proportionalityas an
EthicalPreceptfor Prosecutorsin Their Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 724
(1999) ("Public prosecutors in this country have increasingly become involved in the
investigative stages of criminal matters during the 20th century."). Like Lininger, Little
argues for new rules of ethics to address prosecutors' significant role in the investigation of
criminal activity. See generallyid.
230. See Lininger, supra note 22, at 1273 ("Because officers are so highly dependent
on the involvement of prosecutors in proactive investigations, it should come as no surprise
that constraints on prosecutors often have the transitive effect of constraining the police
officers involved in a particular investigation.").
231. Professor Lininger argues that state bars include both prosecutors and defense
attorneys, as unelected bodies are not as susceptible to political pressures as legislative
bodies. Moreover, he says, the rules state bars adopt must have state supreme court
approval, assuring that state bars will not overreach. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1269. I
have no real quarrel with any of these assertions, but I feel it is important to point out that
they all represent significant assumptions. A state bar laying out rules might, in the end,
take just as conservative a point of view on these issues as government bodies do.
232. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 143 (2007) (noting that professional discipline of prosecutors by state bar

authorities "has proven to be woefully inadequate and ineffective. . . . [R]eferrals [of
prosecutors] to state disciplinary authorities have been few and far between.... [I]n the
relatively few cases that have been referred to state authorities, prosecutors rarely receive
serious discipline."); Richard A. Rosen, Discilinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger,65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 697 (1987) (explaining that, despite
rules prohibiting both prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence and falsification of

evidence in every state, "disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and
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the courage would come from to sanction these prosecutors. Thus,
instituting Professor Lininger's idea would require more than just a
significant change in state legal ethics rules. It would also require the
institutional backbone necessary to enforce the rules he proposes.233
B.

An Attainable Alternative: The NegotiatedApproach

If change with respect to the use of informants seems unlikely to
happen via either judicial or legislative action, there is still another way in
which change in how law enforcement uses informants in mosques might
yet occur. This solution depends not on raw political power or legal
reasoning but on something else: the recognition of how the interests of
law enforcement and the community overlap.234 Viewed correctly, these
meaningful sanctions rarely applied"); Kenneth

Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct,

Convictions, and Double Jeopardy:Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence,71

TEMP.

L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) (observing that there is "a notable absence of disciplinary sanctions
against prosecutors, even in the most egregious cases"); Fred C. Zacharias, The
ProfessionalDiscipline of Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 774 (summarizing results of a
statistical study as showing "overall trend of infrequent [disciplinary] prosecutions" against
prosecutors).
233. Professor Lininger's idea brings to mind another solution, which is less global but
perhaps easier to implement. Instead of bar association rules, a successful effort to stem
the use of surveillance in mosques and other religious institutions without specific
suspicions might be undertaken locally, by individual prosecutors. That is, just as with the
local law enforcement/Muslim community negotiations recommended here, infra Part
IV.B, a local prosecutor-a county district attorney or a federal district's U.S. Attorneymight adopt Professor Lininger's rule as her own internal policy. The prosecutor might
declare that she would bring to court no case using these tactics in religious institutions,
unless specific suspicion of criminality existed prior to the use of the tactic. This would
effectively end the use of informants in cases in which the facts did not satisfy this standard,
as long as the prosecutor stood by the policy and enforced it in the face of any attempt by
law enforcement to bring a case. Precedent exists for such an approach. Taking the
controversy over racial profiling on the highways as a starting point, some prosecutors
observed the heavy reliance of officers involved in drug interdiction efforts on the use of
consent searches. These searches consistently irritated those drivers subject to them; a
disproportionate share of these drivers were African-American and Latino, and the consent
searches of members of these minority groups consistently turned up less contraband than
the consent searches of white drivers. Seeing all of this, one elected prosecutor in a county
in Michigan stated that his office's policy would henceforth require that consent searches
have a basis of reasonable suspicion -something that the law does not require. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US. 218, 222 (1973) (asserting that police need have no
evidence of criminal activity to request consent for a search and that consent given in
response is legally sufficient so long as it is given voluntarily). His office would not pursue
cases involving consent searches in which the officer could not articulate a fact-based
reason to suspect criminal conduct before requesting consent. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES
IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 158-59 (2002).
234. Identifying coinciding interests is an important part of what is sometimes called
problem-solving negotiation, in which the parties or their representatives seek out multiple
interests so as to identify possible areas of overlap that might allow them to come to some
kind of mutual agreement.
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 170-73 (2001) (identifying ways for lawyers engaged in problem-solving
negotiations to find avenues of agreement that may lead to positive-sum outcomes).
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mutual interests can serve as the springboard for the negotiation of a set of
agreed-upon local practices for using informants. Such negotiation could
get law enforcement what it most needs: good (or at least workable)
relations with Muslim communities, a continued flow of information from
these same communities, and an ability to use informants when a real need
exists for them. This process could also get Muslim communities at least
some of what they need: a formal recognition of their opposition to the use
of informants, as well as protection from some of the most egregious (as
they may see it) uses of informants against them. Law enforcement would
give up the right to use informants with total freedom, and the community
would find itself protected, to a degree, from the possibility that police
would place informants into mosques or other religious settings without a
solid, fact-based reason.23 s The path would be difficult, fraught with
obstacles, and, in certain respects, downright unsatisfactory. But it
represents the most promising-and perhaps the only-way forward for
both law enforcement and Muslim communities.
1.

What the NegotiatedApproach Is and What It Mght Strive to Attain
a) Descriptionof the Process

What might such a negotiated approach look like? To start, such
arrangements would be both local and informal. Any given mosque or
Muslim organization would work toward agreement on the use of
informants with its local FBI field office, local agents of the Department of
Homeland Security, and the local police department (if the local
235. With its goal of bringing together overlapping interests of opposing parties to
create a set of workable administrative rules, my approach owes something to the
negotiated rulemaking process that has been used in administrative law contexts, much of it
based on the seminal work of Philip Harter. Harter has examined the importance of
including groups affected by regulations in the development of those regulations. Philip J.
Harter, NegotiatingRegulations:A Cure for Malaise,71 GEO. L. J. 1, 18 (1982) ("Groups
affected by a regulation need the opportunity to actually participate in its development if
they are to have faith in it."). Harter argued that using a negotiated rulemaking process
would have intrinsic benefits because the rule that resulted "would be based on the
consensus of those who would be affected by it." Id. The situation discussed in this article
involving the use of informants is obviously somewhat different; there are already existing
rules, which give all the power in the situation to the police, in the sense that they alone can
decide whether to use informants. The point here is to use a negotiated approach to change
those rules into ones that better reflect the overlapping interests of both parties, thereby
satisfying not just one party, but both. This dovetails neatly with the central principles of
community policing, which requires consultation between police and community
stakeholders to set local priorities and parameters for policing and crime prevention. See,
e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 92 (1990) (explaining that community policing requires "that
police be responsive to citizen demands when they decide what local problems are, and set
their priorities"); Stephanos Bibas, Transparencyand Participationin CriminalProcedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 958 (2006) (describing how cooperative decisionmaking between
police and the communities they serve can reflect neighborhood preferences).
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department involves itself in this type of informant-based investigation)."
A negotiation between locals on both sides of the issue stands the best
chance of succeeding, because those involved in the negotiations may
know each other from efforts already made to build bridges and
connections. The negotiations themselves can serve as trust-building
measures, enhancing and strengthening relationships that already exist, or
helping to create new relationships. These efforts would be informal in the
sense that they would strive not for the imposition of a strict set of legal
standards-for example, a free-standing system for procuring "informant
warrants"-but rather for a set of agreed-upon practices that the parties
would then follow. If one of the parties came to feel that the agreed-upon
practices no longer work, the parties could, together, agree to adjust them.
Best and most importantly, these practices could be tailored to fit local
facts and circumstances-the specific realities that both the community
and law enforcement agencies face daily.
Why would any law enforcement agency agree to negotiate away any
of its power to use informants as part of an arrangement with precisely the
people whom it may want to spy on? The fact that some police agencies
already use internal guidelines to-or at least attempt to-limit some of
the ways in which they use informants, highlights the idea that limiting
agency power to something less than what the Fourth Amendment would
allow can in fact represent the best available practice.237 Given that the
FBI, NYPD, and other law enforcement groups want something from the
Muslim communities-continued and increased cooperation, especially
intelligence on suspicious activities-and given that use of informants in an
unregulated fashion puts those very benefits in jeopardy by undermining
connections with the community, law enforcement may prove more willing
than one might initially assume to engage in such a negotiation.
b)

What Might NegotiationsStrive to Attain?

What exactly might the Muslim community and the police try to agree
upon? Both the interests of the parties and the contours of different types
of anti-terror investigations suggest some initial goals.

236. This may not be an issue for many small police departments, but some large
police departments in the United States are extensively involved in this type of intelligence
gathering. For example, the NYPD, well known for its intelligence work, has used
informants for these matters, most notably in the Herald Square bombing case. See supra
notes 70-72, 94-103 and accompanying text. See also William Finnegan, The Terroism
Beat: How Is the N YP.D. Defending the City?, NEW YORKER, July 25, 2005, at 58
(detailing the use of an informant in the Herald Square case).
237. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text. While the FBI Guidelines
generally preserve the Agency's right to conduct surveillance and explicitly purport not to
create any rights for those affected by a failure to follow the Guidelines, they nevertheless
represent efforts to channel agency discretion toward preferred methods.
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i) Passive Versus Active Informantsand the Standardsfor Using
Them
First, we must examine the methods by which, and the circumstances
within which, law enforcement might use informants. For the sake of
simplicity, let us break the methods of using informants-that is, the types
of informants-into two categories: passive informants and active
informants. In passive informant activity, the informant attends or
participates in any activity-goes to a political rally, takes part in a worship
service, listens to a speech or a sermon, or the like-to the same extent
that any private citizen might. The passive informant observes and reports
to the police what she sees and hears. In other words, the passive
informant acts as a walking camera and audio recorder,238 absorbing
everything around her and reporting what she sees. The passive informant
cannot target any particular individual, and she cannot do anything more
than observe. She might interact with other individuals who are present at
the scene of the observation, but only in ways that prove necessary to
deflect suspicion.
An active informant, on the other hand, would target a particular
person or specific group for observation and interaction. She would seek
to actively connect with these individuals in an effort to gather evidence of
wrongdoing, plotting, or other behavior. An active informant might
"work" a targeted individual closely, perhaps befriending the target and
her family, as long as the informant did not in any way press the target
toward illegal conduct.239
238. The term "walking camera" was actually used in court to describe the NYPD's
undercover police officer in the Herald Square bombing case. Elliott, supra note 16.
239. Concededly, it may not always be easy to distinguish between passive and active
informants and their activity at the margin. The Supreme Court itself must shoulder
responsibility for some of this confusion. In United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980),
the defendant, a suspect in a bank robbery, was in custody and under indictment when an
inmate acting as a government informant heard the defendant make incriminating
statements. The government then sought to introduce these statements into evidence
against the defendant at his trial. The government argued that "the federal agents
instructed Nichols not to question Henry about the robbery." Id. at 271. In an affidavit,
the federal agent involved said that he specifically instructed the informant not to question
or initiate any conversations with the defendant about the bank robbery. Id. at 271 n.8.
But the Supreme Court said that even given these explicit instructions and no evidence that
the informant disobeyed them, the informant did not act passively. "[A]ccording to his own
testimony, Nichols was not a passive listener; rather, he had 'some conversations with
Mr. Henry' while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements were 'the product of
this conversation."' Id.at 271. Thus the Court stressed that even a situation in which the
informant does little more than listen still constitutes more than passive informant activity.
But just six years later, the Court tacked back. In Kuhiman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986),
the Court declared that, when government agents instruct an informant in a jail merely to
listen to a fellow inmate and not to question him, and when the evidence shows that the
informant obeyed those instructions and did nothing more to elicit incriminating statements
from the inmate, this does not violate the Constitution. The informant in Kuhiman had in
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The critical distinction between passive and active informants could
serve as the basis for negotiating the circumstances under which law
enforcement could use informants. The parties could pledge to have
informants work only in a strictly passive way, unless and until some proof
of activity indicating possible terrorist or criminal behavior emerged
during passive observation-exactly as the FBI's rules used to dictate
under the Levi Guidelines.24 0 The idea would be an informant who would
blend in completely and act no differently from any other person present.
Given that we cannot exclude the possibility that religious groups
might (knowingly or unknowingly) harbor small groups or individuals bent
on terrorism, law enforcement should retain the ability to use informants
in these settings, but only passively, as a way to check leads or find out if
any activity exists which deserves some greater degree of attention. A
negotiated agreement would allow law enforcement to have the presence it
sometimes needs, and to have it without any proof of wrongdoing; in other
words, they could use passive informants at their discretion, as they may
now under existing law. At the same time, law enforcement would agree
to exercise this power only passively, so as to minimize intrusion and
interference. This arrangement seems like a good idea from both the point
of view of law enforcement success, because it allows police and security
agencies to look and listen for any indicators of real trouble, and from the
point of view of the communities, because they would have assurance that
the worship and fellowship that form the core of activities at religious
institutions would not encounter government interference or disruption,
unless absolutely necessary.24 1
fact made direct comments to the inmate about the validity of his explanation for the crime,
saying that the inmate's "initial version of his participation in the crimes 'didn't sound too
good."' 477 U.S. at 460. This statement did not, in the Court's opinion, make the
informant a more-than-passive participant in the conversation, though the statement seems
part of an ongoing conversation and could clearly give the impression to the hearer that the
person speaking had better say something more convincing. Id. This seems to have been
the Court of Appeals' take on the interaction. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("[S]lowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal intercourse with [respondent] served
to exacerbate [respondent's] already troubled state of mind."), rev'd by Kuhlman, 477 U.S.
at 461. One could not fault readers of the Court's opinions in Henry and Kuhlman for not
understanding the differences between the two cases. In both, federal agents instruct an
informant not to question or get involved in conversation with the target of the
investigation; in both cases, the informant has at least some minimal discussion with the
target. In Henry, the Court condemned the action; in Kuhiman, it accepted it. For this
reason, if no other, we must use our own definition of active and passive informant activity.
As described above, passive informants engage in the activity around them, just as anyone
else in that context could, but they do nothing more; any informant who does more receives
the designation of active informant.
240. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
241. My use of the phrase "minimize intrusion and interference" in this paragraph is
deliberate. Distinguishing between passive and active informant use, and requiring an
evidentiary basis for the latter, will not eliminate all concerns about the chilling of
expressive and associational rights, but it will minimize them. Worshippers and community
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Something more would be required for law enforcement to make use
of active informants under a negotiated agreement. In particular, the use
of active informants would require some evidence. Law enforcement
could use active informants only if some reasonable,fact-based suspicion
existed to link a particular suspect or suspects to engagement in terrorist
activity or other criminal conduct. That is, the police would agree not to
use an active informant just to make sure nothing is happening. Rather,
the use of active informants would require some minimal evidencesomething more than a hunch, feeling, or intuition-indicating that illegal
activity has been, is, or will be taking place. Police officers involved in any
investigation should have little difficulty understanding this reasonable,
fact-based suspicion rule because it comes from Terry v. Ohio, under
which courts have used the same standard to test police officers' decisions
to stop and frisk suspects for almost forty years.242 A system regulating
informant use according to whether the facts would support a passive or
active informant operation would allow the government to use relatively
unintrusive passive informants without seeking permission; more intrusive
(i.e., active) informant activity would require fact-based suspicion that
terrorist or other criminal activity might be afoot. This bifurcation would
give the government the flexibility it needs to gather information or
investigate leads, but it would also require some evidence to conduct active
informant investigations and limit these investigations to situations
potentially posing danger.

members could feel more (if not entirely) secure that government agents would not intrude
into their associational settings, and that if and when they did so, it would only happen
when a fact-based reason to do so exists and not as part of a government fishing expedition.
Obviously, the concern is not entirely eliminated, but, given that a balance must be struck
between First Amendment concerns and legitimate efforts to assure security, this
arrangement would come much closer than the status quo to assuring the integrity of these
core freedoms.
242. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("And in justifying the particular intrusion
the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
The Terry case gave law enforcement a workable, non-technical way of deciding whether
they could temporarily detain a suspect and then perform a cursory search of the suspect
for weapons. Over the years, the Supreme Court has stressed that the Terry reasonable
suspicion standard mandates a common sense, practical approach. See, e.g., United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (stating that the assessment is to be based on a totality of
the circumstances and that the evidence collected must be seen by those versed in the field
of law enforcement). To demonstrate reasonable suspicion, evidence must concern conduct
by particular individuals, id. (explaining that the demand for particularized suspicion about
an individuals lies at the core of the Terry requirement), but it need not support proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or even probable cause, see Teny, 392 U.S. at 24 (explaining
the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and prospective victims of
violence even where they may lack probable cause).
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K)

The "Entrapment"Problem:No Encouragement

Second, communities and police departments could use negotiated
agreements to address the issue of entrapment. As earlier discussion
makes clear, neither the entrapment defense nor its cousin, the claim of
outrageous government conduct, does much to safeguard targets of police
informants against government or informant overreaching.24 3 At worst,
entrapment actually permits the government to create crimes as long as the
defendant has the appropriate "predispostion." 2"
The lack of protection these defenses provide targeted individuals in
practice begins to rankle when viewed with an eye more lay than legal.
For example, in Hamid Hayat's case in Lodi, California, the jury convicted
Hayat of providing material support or resources to terrorists, even though
an informant deliberately and purposely pushed and goaded Hayat to
attend a terrorist training camp.245 Even the U.S. Attorney whose office
charged and convicted Hayat stated that he wished that "other things had
occurred" during the course of conversations between the informant and
Hayat.246
Cases like these may not constitute entrapment in the legal sense, but
they leave the impression that law enforcement may not play fair in pursuit
of a conviction. Put another way, just because the police can use
informants in this aggressive way without running afoul of entrapment law,
does not mean that law enforcement should do just that. All Americans
want law enforcement to apprehend dangerous terrorists and halt their
plans. However, the government's use of overly aggressive and possibly
unfair tactics to pursue individuals who seem to pose no real threat to our
national security undermines the public's confidence in anti-terror work.
Whether right or wrong, these perceptions that the government has not
played fair do damage to law enforcement's ability to obtain cooperation
from the public.
Thus, as an element of their negotiations, police and Muslim
communities could agree that informants would not act in any way to
encourage or shape the behavior of those under surveillance, either
through incitement or agitation. In some instances, it might be difficult to
243. See supra Section II.B.1-2.
244. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. Speaking in a strictly legal sense,
one can say that no entrapment problem exists and that the defenses of entrapment and
outrageous government conduct simply have a narrow focus. In and of itself, this
narrowness does not make either of these defenses or the results reached under them
wrong.
245. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
246. Interview: McGregor W. Scott, supra note 73 (commenting on the informant's
recorded efforts to push Hayat to go to a terrorist training camp). Testimony in the Siraj
case in New York also showed a naive, impressionable target, led on by an informant using
strong suggestiveness. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
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tell the difference between encouragement and providing an opportunity
for criminal conduct, but an agreed-upon rule against pushing or goading
targets would, in most cases, not prove difficult to apply. For example, a
rule of this nature would not allow the type of behavior reflected in the
testimony in the Hayat case, in which the informant threatened the target
and belittled him for failing to go to a terrorist camp.247
iii) Use of Informants as a Last (or at Least Latter) Option
When it becomes known or suspected, the placement of informants in
religious institutions like mosques does considerable damage. The
presence of informants, either real or imagined, can undermine religious
custom and practices, undercut the ability of believers to trust each other,
and pull apart the social fabric that binds co-religionists together.24 8 Given
the explicit First Amendment protections provided for the free exercise of
religion in the United States 249 and the chilling effect that even the
possibility of informant use may have, the use of informants in mosques
and other religious settings ought not to occur regularly.
As part of an agreement, communities and local police or the FBI
might agree that, because the insertion of informants into religious
institutions carries with it significant First Amendment implications and
the potential for damage both to individuals and to the whole religious
community spied on, the use of informants in religious settings will not be
a routine practice. The agreements can establish that law enforcement can
use informants in these settings only when other, less intrusive methods
either have not worked or could not work, and where use of an informant
will most likely produce evidence. Both law enforcement and Muslim
communities gain if the use of informants becomes a tactic of last resort
(or nearly so) and not a method employed regularly. For many Muslim
communities, the use of informants only when other methods will not work
will reassure them that they need not fear the presence of informants at
every point and that the government will exercise some restraint in using
this tactic. It should also maximize the chances that informants will catch
those who pose a real danger and minimize the chances that informants
247. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. There is a subtle but important
difference between regulating the use of active informants and the steps directed in this
subsection against entrapment. Regulation of the use of active informants is necessary
because, while active informants might attempt in some cases to goad targets into action,
their primary goal is to get the targets talking for the purpose of gathering intelligence. In
contrast, entrapment cases almost always involve more: the informants in those cases push
the defendants to engage in criminal activity. Thus both types of informant regulation are
necessary.
248. See supra Part III.B.3.
249. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ).
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will snare only those most susceptible to persuasion.
iv) Education Across the Divide
Fourth, the parties might agree on a process of mutual education. For
its part, law enforcement might educate Muslim groups and congregations
so that they could recognize actual suspicious behavior, as opposed to
simply relying on hunches about people who have unusual opinions. It has
become common for police departments and the FBI to appeal to Muslim
communities to report anything suspicious, much as FBI Director Mueller
did in the speech quoted at the beginning of this article.25 0 While there is
no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mueller's exhortation, it was also quite
general. It is all very well to ask community members to report their
suspicions, and even such a general request may produce leads for law
It is true that not all leads may actually help law
enforcement.
enforcement; this is true even when all the leads in an investigation
originate from law enforcement professionals. It seems likely that an
untrained member of the public, if asked to provide information to the
police about something as unusual as possible terrorist activity, would, in
good faith, inevitably produce mostly (if not wholly) useless leads, which
officers and agents must then spend their valuable time pursuing. Without
some concrete indication of what "suspicious action" means, most lay
people would stand little chance of spotting the real thing.
Training communities regarding the types of information that law
enforcement agencies want is one way to improve the amount of useful
Moreover, the FBI, the
information law enforcement receives.
Department of Homeland Security, and even local police are in a good
position to provide such training. For their part, Muslim communities
could educate law enforcement about social and religious customs,
particularly habits of language. Considerable amounts of such cultural and
religious training regarding the customs and mores of Islam, by Muslims
for police and FBI agents, already takes place.2 1 Many police chiefs and
law enforcement administrators at all levels have expressed enthusiastic
support for these efforts and stated that this type of training has greatly
enhanced their agencies' capabilities, as well as relationships with the
Muslim communities. 2
Language is a special area of concern that these trainings should
250. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
251. E.g., Buckley, supra note 58 (discussing a Turkish imam whom the NYPD hired
to give seminars to police officers on "Islam 101").
252. For example, under former Superintendent Terrance Hillard, the Chicago Police
Department conducted outreach efforts to Muslim communities; these efforts culminated in
a short film for police officers on how to handle Muslim travelers at Chicago's O'Hare
International Airport. See supranotes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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specifically address. Arabic speakers may sometimes express opinions in
Arabic in stronger, more vehement ways than one might hear in English;
these kinds of comments can hit Western ears as angry, radical, or
extremist-even when speakers intend nothing of the sort." While it is
true that law enforcement must react vigorously to any words expressing
an intention to take some illegal or dangerous action, they must also
exercise caution, because linguistic, stylistic, and idiomatic differences can
give a listener a misleading impression.
A couple of recent examples help illustrate just how important
In Hamid
linguistic understanding-or misunderstanding-can be.
Hayat's trial for, among other things, providing material support for a
transnational terrorist act, prosecutors needed to prove that Hayat
intended to commit terrorism.254 To do so, they offered into evidence what
became known as "the throat note,"255 a fragment of paper with Arabic
writing on it that police had found in Hayat's wallet when they arrested
him.256 The prosecution first translated the words as "Lord, let us be at
their throats, and we ask you to give us refuge from their evil."257 After the
defense protested, the prosecution amended the translation to "Oh Allah,
we place you at their throats, and we seek refuge in you from their evil."258
According to authoritative sources, the defense had been right to object
because the passage contained a traditional prayer "reported to have been
said by the Prophet [Mohammad] when he feared harm from a group of
people." 259 Still, the prosecution told the jury that the note proved that
Hayat had the "requisite jihadist intent."21 In the end, Hayat's intent
and the note played a
became the central question in jury deliberations,
26 1
crucial role in persuading the jury to convict him.
253. As one translator in a domestic terrorism case explained, this intonation is a
linguistic and cultural characteristic that some outside the Arab world may not understand.
See Vanessa Blum, Translatorin Padilla Case Pokes Holes in Prosecution Case, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, July 23, 2007, at 3B (quoting an Arabic translator as saying, "Arabic is a
more flowery language [than English]. They use figures of speech .... In English we tend
to be more direct."). See also Carmen Gentile, Defense at Padilla Trial Raises a Dispute
over Translations,N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2007, at A16 (reporting that an Arabic translator
testified in a terrorism trial that remarks used in wiretapped conversation were not code for
supporting jihad, as government witnesses had asserted, but rather were "references to
fund-raising for children whose parents were killed in conflicts like those in Kosovo,
Lebanon, and Somalia").
254. Amy Waldman, PropheticJustice,ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2006, at 82, 83.
255. Id.at 83.
256. Id
257. Id
258. Id.
259. Id.at 90 (quoting a professor of Islamic Studies at Hartford Seminary).
260. Id.at 82.
261. See id. at 92 (recounting how Hayat's "words, more than his deeds" became
decisive for the jury).
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In the case of accused terrorist Jose Padilla, similar questions about
language arose. The government's case against Padilla and two codefendants relied heavily on hours of wiretapped phone calls, and a
government witness testified that Padilla's co-defendants had used "code
words" to speak about jihad. 262 An expert witness, an Arabic translator,
disagreed; he said that the men were simply speaking indirectlysomething common in the Arab world-and not in code.263
Police need education so that they can tell the difference between an
opinion-even a strongly expressed, non-mainstream, anti-American
one-and clues to acts of terrorism. Having such opinions does not
necessarily make people dangerous, and American citizens (if not all
people living in America) have a right to hold and express such views. A
person who says she approves of the actions of Osama Bin Laden, or who
expresses her wish that the President of the United States were dead, or
who says that America deserved what it got on 9/11, may strike us as
intemperate, wrongheaded, or repugnant. But those statements make the
person only a holder of repellent and terribly misinformed opinions, not a
terrorist. Expressing opinions, even objectionable ones, remains an
American right; doing so in a fashion that seems harsh or even aggressive
has to do with style and custom of speech, and it does not necessarily make
it likely that these opinions will ripen into action.
These four suggestions-distinguishing between active and passive
informant activity and regulating accordingly, prohibiting encouragement,
using informants only as a last resort, and instituting mutual educationjust scratch the surface of what police agencies and the members of
American Muslim communities could agree to. Given the local focus of
the negotiations, many concerns particular to the jurisdiction might also
surface. These focused elements would constitute a major advantage for
this process, because the better tailored the process is to its own context,
the better its chances for success. The local negotiation of a set of
practices acceptable to both sides in the debate presents a workable
alternative, and one that takes advantage of mutually reinforcing needs of
law enforcement and the Muslim communities in our country, as well as
the common need to protect ourselves from terrorism.
2.

Obstacles and Shortcomings of the NegotiatedApproach

To be sure, the negotiated approach has flaws. It is not a perfect
system for accomplishing the twin goals of winning help and intelligence
for law enforcement on the one hand, and winning respect for the Muslim
262. Blum, supra note 253.
263. See id. (reporting that the translator testified that the words and phrases that the
prosecution characterized as code "were Arabic expressions with meaning that could be
lost in translation").
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community on the other. As things stand, no existing solution can put
these two objectives perfectly in balance. But while some degree of
tension between them seems inevitable, the negotiated approach comes
closest to a reasonable balance. Nevertheless, any proponent of this
approach must reckon with at least three specific problems.
First, the negotiated approach would carry with it substantial
What if police agree to an
questions concerning enforceability.
including the four points
perhaps
arrangement with their Muslim partners,
described above, but in some particular case decide that they will not abide
by it, for what they believe to be good and sufficient reasons? For
example, suppose that law enforcement were to hear rumors of suspicion
surrounding a very religious foreigner, new to the Muslim community.
Besides the religious nature of the person's appearance and practices, no
known factual basis for suspicion exists. The police may simply decide that
they do not want to take a chance that someone harmful will slip through
their fingers, so they decide, without any reasonable suspicion, that the
case calls for the use of an active informant. Should this become known,
no one-no institution, no court, no judge, no inspector, no arbiter-could
do anything to enforce the rules that the police had agreed to with the
Muslim community; neither the community nor anyone else would have
standing to litigate the matter or any enforceable right to take action.
Without any kind of enforcement mechanism, negotiated agreements of
the type proposed here would bind the police only in the loosest sense.
Second, it is impossible to ignore the unbalanced power inherent in
such a negotiation. Law enforcement does not have to agree to anything;
it now has all the power it needs to use informants in any way and at any
time it wants, and it need not seek permission from anyone to use this
power, least of all from the (Muslim) community under scrutiny. While
this unilateral approach clearly has costs,2 law enforcement may freely
ignore them under the status quo if it wishes. Muslim communities, for
their parts, have no power to force the police to the bargaining table, and
they cannot force any change in police policy. They can only caution the
police that, if they perceive informants being used and overused in their
religious institutions, many Muslims will become more fearful and less
trusting of law enforcement, as well as less likely to approach police with
vital information.265
264. See supra Section III.B.3.
265. An imbalance of power between parties can potentially leave little room for an
outcome that might actually form an acceptable basis for going forward. But this problem
is not unfamiliar, especially in the context of negotiation between government units and
citizens. E.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE 411, 93-94, 101-05, 200-01, 241-43 (1987) (discussing the fact that, once an agreement is
ratified, "the negotiating parties must find a way to link the ad hoc, informal agreement
they have fashioned to the formal decision-making processes of government"). More to the
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Surely, both of these ideas constitute fair criticism. Still, both merely
redirect us to the underlying premise of the whole negotiated approach.
The police both want and need the cooperation of the community and the
crucial intelligence that a cooperative relationship facilitates. If and when
law enforcement recognizes this fact, the desire of the police to further the
building of such relationships will serve as the enforcement mechanism.
This will not always be enough to restrain law enforcement and force it to
consistently honor its obligations under a negotiated agreement, but it is
preferable to the alternative. It is better than the current "we make the
rules" approach, and certainly preferable from the perspective of the
community, for which a negotiated arrangement limiting the use of
informants can only be an improvement.
Third, the local aspect of the negotiated approach proposed here,
explained as one of its strengths, may also constitute a weakness. Because
of the stratified nature of law enforcement in the United States, there
would be multiple law enforcement entities with which any Muslim
community wishing to negotiate an agreement would have to deal. There
are local departments for cities and counties, often with overlapping
point, citizens and public interest advocates often have "concerns about entering
negotiations when resources and political power are unequally distributed. . .. Power and
politics are essential ingredients in all public disputes, and they cannot be ignored. But
consensus-building approaches to dispute resolution place a premium on problem solving
rather than 'settling' disputes.... When a powerful group commits to work for consensus,
it tacitly agrees that raw political power is not a sufficient basis for resolving public
disputes. This empowers those who are less politically powerful." Id at 241-43. See also
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH
COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 513
(2007) ("Instead of the eternally frustrating political and judicial stalemate that often
accompanies decisions involving siting of waste-disposal facilities or low-income housing,
might it not be more productive to seek negotiated agreement of such disputes?"). One
way to deal with this reality of power unequally distributed between negotiating parties is
suggested by ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d ed. 1991), in which the authors advocate
developing a "BATNA"-best alternative to a negotiated agreement-as a way to generate
power in an unequal bargaining situation:
No method can guarantee success if all the leverage lies on the other side....
People think of negotiating power as being determined by resources like wealth,
political connections, physical strength, friends, and military might. In fact, the
relative negotiating power of two parties depends primarily upon how attractive
to each is the option of not reaching agreement.... [But a]ttractive alternatives
are not just sitting there waiting for you; you usually have to develop them.

Id. at 97, 102-03.
One alternative to a negotiated agreement that would be useful to increase the
leverage of the Muslim community vis-A-vis law enforcement, either within the context of
the type of negotiation suggested here or within a situation in which law enforcement
refuses to enter into negotiations on the issue of the use of informants, would be to prepare
to have the Muslim community reduce or end its cooperative, voluntary contacts with
police and the FBI. These contacts are obviously something that law enforcement wants
and needs; being prepared to withdraw them (and letting the other side know this) could be
an effective way of forcing the discussion along.
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jurisdiction. A local police department-even a large one, like the
NYPD-could adopt its own policies on these matters. There are also
federal agencies, such as the FBI, that play primary anti-terrorism roles.
To make matters even more complex, the federal level is itself stratified.
The FBI has fifty-six field offices around the country, as well as more than
400 regional agencies in smaller towns and cities.2" Each one of these field
offices reports to FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., and must follow
national FBI policy.267 Moreover, the FBI itself is only one part of U.S.
Department of Justice, which has the final say over FBI policy. As a
result, even if a local FBI office wishes to negotiate and agree to a set of
limits and rules for the use of informants, it remains less than clear
whether it would have the power to do so, or whether FBI headquarters or
the Department of Justice would allow it.
This stratification means that any Muslim community wishing to
negotiate an agreement of the type I suggest would have to ask some
serious questions regarding its negotiations. With which office or offices
should they negotiate? Should they contact only the FBI, or also the local
police? Finally, would working with the local FBI office and not FBI
headquarters (to say nothing of the Department of Justice) be enough?
These questions could not go unanswered in any successful
implementation.
A fourth concern parallels the third. The phrase "Muslim community"
may mislead us into thinking that, even if "law enforcement" may
represent many different levels of government, at least the community side
of the negotiation would come to the task unified. This vastly
underestimates the heterogeneity of Muslim communities in the United
States. According to the Pew Research Center, as of 2007, there were
approximately 2.35 million Muslims in the United States. 2 68 As the Pew
study makes clear, the Muslim population in the United States is incredibly
diverse. "Muslim immigrants to the United States come from at least 68
countries, and have different traditions, practices, doctrines, languages,
and beliefs. In addition, large numbers are native-born Americans who
have converted to Islam or have returned to the faith... ."269 An
estimated sixty-five percent of Muslims living in the United States were
born outside the United States; of these, twenty-four percent are from the
Arab world, eighteen percent from South Asia, eight percent from Iran,
five percent from Europe, and four percent from Africa.27 0 With such
266. Federal Bureau of Investigation, About Us-Quick Facts, http://www.fbi.gov/
quickfacts.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
267. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Facts & Figures, http://www.fbi.gov/
facts-andfigures/headquarters.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
268. See PEw RESEARCH CTR., supra note 9, at 10.
269. Id. at 11.
270. Id. at 15.
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varied backgrounds, no one should describe the Muslim community
anywhere, particularly in any large population center, as monolithic. This
lack of uniformity creates another set of challenges: each Muslim
community within any city or town must negotiate its own agreement(s)
with law enforcement, unless it can unite with all or most of the other
communities in its area. When communities have differing backgrounds,
they may also perceive themselves to have divergent interests, which may
make uniting for this purpose quite difficult.
Given these obstacles, the outlook for local control of policy on
informant use is decidedly mixed, but it is not hopeless. In the recent past,
locally-generated ideas have proven very helpful to the FBI in some
sensitive anti-terrorism efforts. For example, after the Department of
Justice ordered the FBI to conduct 5000 "voluntary" interviews with young
Arab and Muslim men not suspected of terrorism in late 2001,271 many in
law enforcement expressed doubts about this plan.272 More important,
many thought that the FBI would endanger the budding relationships it
had built with the Arab and Muslim communities after 9/11.211 When FBI
agents and others in Detroit came up with an alternative plan-sending
letters to potential interviewees-the Department of Justice showed
flexibility and allowed them to try this. 274 The alternative plan was
unmistakably successful; the Detroit field office had the highest rate of
successfully completed interviews of any office in the nation.275 Thus, it is
certainly possible that the FBI and its governmental parent could negotiate
localized solutions to intelligence gathering.
CONCLUSION

The possibility of terrorists on American soil, particularly the prospect
of homegrown terrorists, means that we should expect law enforcement to
use every legal tool at its disposal to gather intelligence necessary to thwart
attacks. Given the law as it now stands, these tools include the almost
complete discretion for police to plant and use informants. Thus, we
271. See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney Gen. of the U.S., supranote 43.
272. For some, the plan's legality was questionable. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Police Are
Split on Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al (quoting local
police chiefs as saying that the program violated laws of their state or civil liberties
generally). For others, it was just plain bad anti-terrorism work. See McGee, supra note 43
(reporting that eight former high-ranking FBI officials, including a former FBI director,
criticized the program and doubted that it would produce anything of value).
273. HARRIS, supra note 38, at 10. These relationships constituted crucial assets in the
struggle against terror, and some FBI agents wanted very much to avoid the damage that
would follow if agents began showing up unannounced at the homes and business of the
5000 "nonsuspects." Id. at 10-11.
274. Id. at 34-35
275. Id. at 35.
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should expect to see informants do almost anything to succeed in
producing cases against targets.
Every person living in this country, whether she is an American citizen
or not, has a strong interest in securing the nation against terrorist attacks.
However, just because the law says that police can use informants at
almost any time, in any setting, does not mean that they shoulddo so. And
the particular contours of the struggle in which we now find ourselves
illuminates this can/should distinction as few others have. As the law
enforcement officials and intelligence officers in charge of our safety and
security know better than almost anyone, our ability to track potential
terrorists and stop them before they act depends wholly on the availability
of intelligence. Because the best, if not the only, source of crucial
intelligence on potential extremists with Islamic backgrounds will continue
to be American Muslim communities, we must have solid, well-grounded
relationships with these communities, both native and foreign-born.
These relationships are not just a matter of public relations, political
correctness, or appeasement. Rather, these communities must feel that
they can regard law enforcement as trusted partners, because such
relationships create the avenues and opportunities for the passing of
critical information from the communities on the ground to law
enforcement. The widespread use of informants in Muslim institutions,
particularly mosques, will corrode these important relationships by sowing
distrust. By causing Muslims to think that the FBI or any other police
agency regards them not as trusted partners but as potential suspects, fear
displaces trust. Moreover, fear will cause members of the Muslim
community to become less likely to come forward with information-just
as the members of any community would, given this type of scrutiny. On
the one hand, we simply cannot afford for this to happen, but, on the other
hand, we know that there will be cases-indeed, from the government's
point of view, there already have been cases-in which the use of
informants can play a crucial role.
Given these tensions, as well as the mutual interests of law
enforcement and Muslim communities in the United States, the situation
presents an ideal context in which to try regulating the government's use of
informants through local, negotiated agreements on acceptable practices.
In at least the four ways identified here, law enforcement and Muslim
communities could agree to limit the use of informants, without either
ruling out their use or allowing their unrestricted use. Both sides would
benefit. While the approach proposed here would certainly face
substantial obstacles, it represents a chance to recalibrate an important
aspect of the government's power to investigate, while at the same time
preserving the sanctity of the community's institutions of worship to the
greatest extent possible.
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